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Competition and cooperation represent two foundational elements within the strategic 
management research domain.  While substantial research examining competition or cooperation 
exists, research assessing these two paradoxical actions simultaneously has been limited.  This 
study leverages the attention based view of the firm and insights from literature examining 
organizational ambidexterity to further understand if, and how, these two seemingly 
contradictory actions are managed and leveraged by firms.  First, this research identifies and 
assesses the extent to which attention within the firm shapes competitive and cooperative action.  
Further, this research conceptually defines and empirically tests curvilinear relationships 
between competitive and cooperative action and subsequent firm performance.  Finally, this 
study predicts and tests the performance implications associated with balancing competitive and 
cooperative actions. 
The findings suggest that attention to cooperation is associated with subsequent 
cooperative action, and that the curvilinear relationship between cooperative action and firm 
performance is moderated by cooperative action diversity such that high levels of action 
diversity lead to poorer performance.  In the context of competitive actions, the results are found 
to be nonsignficant, but present valuable opportunities for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past few decades, strategic management has developed into a respected domain 
of academic inquiry within the social sciences.  At the core of strategic management is the means 
through which firms leverage resources to develop competitive advantages and enhance firm 
performance (Nag, Hambrick, & Chen, 2007).  Indeed, in a recent analysis of how the term 
strategy has been defined since the field’s inception, the general concept of strategy has been 
characterized as “the dynamics of the firm’s relation with its environment for which the 
necessary actions are taken to achieve its goals and/or increase performance by means of the 
rational use of resources” (Ronda‐Pupo & Guerras‐Martin, 2012).  While strategic management 
includes several independent substreams such as competitive dynamics (Chen & Miller, 2012), 
interorganizational relationships (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011), the importance of internal 
resources (Barney, 1991), and the nature of the external environment (Porter, 1991), the core 
tenets of strategic management research focus on (1) a firm, (2) its actions, (3) application of 
resources, and (4) the presence of, and interaction with, an external environment (Nag et al., 
2007).  Each of these four elements is present in a firm’s competitive and cooperative decisions. 
 Considering the above definition of strategy, one of the core actions firms engage in 
regularly is competition.  Competitive actions are indicative of how a firm attempts to gain a 
competitive advantage relative to peers, how a firm seeks out and implements strategies, and 
how a firm leverages internal resources most effectively in the broader external environment 
(Ketchen, Snow, & Hoover, 2004).  Competition research within the domain of strategic 
management represents the integration of the firm’s internal resources, the actions the firm takes 
to capitalize on these resources, and the environments in which these behaviors are enacted 
(Ferrier, 2001; Ndofor, Sirmon, & He, 2011; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990).  Due to the clear 
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parallel between the definition of strategy and the nature of competition, research on competition 
continues to remain a core stream of research within the domain of strategic management. 
 On the other hand, cooperation also represents a domain of research within strategic 
management that has flourished due to clear parallels with the core elements of strategy.  
Interorganizational relationships at multiple levels have attracted scholarly attention and 
provided the academic community with rich insights into the motivation and outcomes 
associated with engaging in cooperative actions (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Ring & Van de 
Ven, 1994).  Topics such as how firms select partner firms, how firms manage the dynamics 
associated with relationships, and how firms manage an alliance portfolio are all representative 
of how and why firms engage in cooperation (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Jiang, Tao, & Santoro, 2010; 
Parkhe, 1993).   As firms engage in interorganizational relationships, they are directly engaging 
the external environment and seeking out ways to acquire and leverage resources (Parmigiani & 
Rivera-Santos, 2011).  Considering the extant research conducted on cooperative behaviors of 
firms, it is clear that cooperation research represents an integral element of strategic 
management. 
 While competitive and cooperative behaviors are both core issues within the strategic 
management research domain, little research has been conducted that integrates both types of 
behaviors of the firm (Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997).  Considering all firms engage in some type 
of competitive activity and most firms engage in cooperative relationships, it is clear that the 
majority of organizations engage in both competitive and cooperative behaviors, rather than one 
or the other (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  Also, research integrating competition and cooperation 
remains relatively inconclusive as to the nature of the relationship between a firm’s competitive 
and cooperative behaviors (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014).  While scholars suggest the two are 
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related and possibly interdependent, empirical work examining the extent to which these two 
types of actions are related has been limited (Chen, 2008).  In order to further develop strategic 
management research in the domains of competition and cooperation, it is imperative that 
research integrate both types of actions of the firm to understand (1) if the two are related, (2) 
how the two are related, and (3) how the relationship between the two influences a firm’s 
performance.  This study surveys existing literature on both competition and cooperation, as well 
as both attention-based view and ambidexterity literature to further understand how 
organizations enact and manage competitive and cooperative actions simultaneously. 
Competition and Cooperation 
 Independently, research on competition and cooperation has provided valuable 
contributions to the literature.  Competition research, for example, has extended the management 
literature by studying how competition impacts interactions with other firms and how firm 
behaviors relate to the firm’s competitive positioning relative to peers (Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 
1999; Upson, Ketchen, Connelly, & Ranft, 2012).  Within the broad domain of competition, 
competitive dynamics researchers have integrated the interactive nature of competition among 
firms and how actions and reactions influence the competitive environment of the firm (Rindova, 
Ferrier, & Wiltbank, 2010).  While this external approach to understanding competition provides 
useful insights as to the nature of realized competition, it does not necessarily identify and 
address how internal factors such as attention and limitations associated with attention influence 
the decision and ability to engage in competitive activity.  Research within the competition 
domain have proposed stronger links between micro and macro organizational factors that could 
provide both fields with rich insights (Chen & Miller, 2012).   Within the competitive research 
domain, research that simultaneously integrates and examines external contingencies with 
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internal characteristics could offer a strong contribution and extension of the competition 
literature. 
 While competition research has been an integral part of strategic management research, 
researchers focused on cooperation have also made valuable contributions to the literature.  
Building off of the proverb that ‘no man is an island,’ cooperation research suggests that no 
organization truly exists completely independent of its relationships with others (Parmigiani & 
Rivera-Santos, 2011).  Cooperation research has flourished in terms of identifying the motivation 
for interorganizational relationships, digging deeper into how firms manage cooperation within a 
dyad, and also identified how a firm develops a network of cooperative engagements (Hillman, 
Withers, & Collins, 2009; Provan et al., 2007).  Traditionally, research has provided valuable 
insights into joint ventures and alliances among industry peers as a means for assessing a firm’s 
cooperative behaviors (Ahuja, Lampert, & Tandon, 2008; Brouthers & Hennart, 2007); however, 
firms also engage upstream and downstream partners for cooperative relationships (Mayer & 
Teece, 2008).  Also, while the dynamics associated with dyadic cooperative engagements has 
proven to be a strong area of focus for cooperation research, little research has identified and 
assessed how firms manage cooperative engagements holistically from a portfolio perspective 
that integrates and assesses a firm’s entire set of cooperative behaviors simultaneously 
(Wassmer, 2010).  While much research has been done on interorganizational relationships, 
ample opportunities exist in areas such as non-industry relationships and also focusing attention 
on a firm’s cooperative portfolio in its entirety rather than at the dyad level. 
 While both competition and cooperation research streams have developed and flourished 
independently, the cross-fertilization between these two domains has been limited (Chen, 2008).  
Research has examined the extent to which network positioning influences competitive 
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behaviors, and how competition influences cooperation among firms (Gimeno, 2004; Gnyawali 
& Madhavan, 2001); however, little research has examined the extent to which firms manage and 
balance these two types of behaviors within the firm.  While both competition and cooperation 
have been studied extensively by strategic management scholars, integration of these two 
domains of inquiry will provide strong contributions to both independent streams of research and 
strategic management research at large.  One of the purposes of this study is to identify and 
assess the nature of the relationship between competition and cooperation by applying and 
leveraging theoretical insights from the attention-based view of the firm and the ambidexterity 
literature.  By coupling the insights from the attention-based view with the logic presented in the 
existing ambidexterity literature (March, 1991; Ocasio, 1997), the following section elaborates 
on how these theoretical foundations provide an appropriate lens through which to view the 
competition and cooperation paradox. 
Theoretical Background 
Integrating competition and cooperation into a research model necessitates the 
application of theories that can shed light on how two seemingly contradictory actions can be 
related and how these actions are managed by the firm.  Competition and cooperation are 
manifested in the actions of the firm, and these actions are indicative of where a firm directs its 
attention (Cyert & March, 1963).  As such, the attention based view (ABV) of the firm can be 
leveraged as a means for understanding how a firm’s actions are a result of where the firm 
directs its organizational attention and focuses its finite cognitive resources (Ocasio, 1997).  
Firms develop strategies, apply resources, and enact behaviors based on the extent to which they 
structure and focus their organizational attention as a means for improving performance 
(Nadkarni & Barr, 2008).  Where a firm focuses attention will likely be manifested in firm 
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actions, and these actions, in turn, are likely to be related to the firm’s performance.  As such, I 
present a research model that assesses where firms focus attention, the firms subsequent actions, 
and the performance associated with these previous actions.  While the attention based view of 
the firm suggests that an organization’s attention is likely to predict its actions (Ocasio, 2011), 
little research has explicitly focused on attention at the firm level. 
 A second literature that can provide insights into the nature of the relationship between 
competition and cooperation can be found in the research on ambidexterity.  Ambidexterity 
research suggests that firms engage in exploratory and exploitative behaviors and must manage 
these behaviors in a way that maximizes the firm’s performance (March, 1991).  Exploratory 
behaviors are represented by behaviors focused on developing new products and pioneering new 
technologies, whereas exploitative behaviors are represented by how a firm hopes to capitalize 
on its existing technologies or leveraging current resources to improve performance (He & 
Wong, 2004).  The exploration versus exploitation paradox shares many parallels with the 
discussion about how competition and cooperation may be related, namely the extent to which 
these behaviors are directly or interactively related (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006).  The core 
elements of ambidexterity that are critical to understanding the current research model are (1) the 
paradoxical nature of competition and cooperation and (2) the concept of balance of these 
seemingly opposing actions.  By leveraging insights from the ambidexterity literature, this study 
takes a critical first step to clarify some of the questions regarding if and how competition and 
cooperation are related and may need to co-exist. 
Research Model 
 The purpose of this study is to address two gaps in the competition and cooperation 
research streams—namely the lack of integration across these two streams of research and the 
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integration of micro and macro factors of the firm simultaneously.  This study also seeks to 
extend the theoretical application of both the attention-based view of the firm and ambidexterity 
literature to further understand the nature of the relationship between competition and 
cooperation.  The present study makes one of the first applications of attention-based view of the 
firm to the organizational level, and also extends the ambidexterity logic to a new context by 
assessing how the predictions from ambidexterity relate to how a firm balances competition and 
cooperation and how this balance influences the firm’s performance.  Finally, the nature and 
diversity of competitive and cooperative actions are identified as important moderators of how 
competition, cooperation, and the balance of these two influence a firm’s performance.  Each of 
these issues is discussed below. 
 The attention-based view of the firm suggests that where a firm focuses its organizational 
attention is also where actions will be enacted (Ocasio, 1997).  As such, the front end of the 
model displayed in Figure 1 proposes that where a firm directs its attention is positively related 
to the actions that are indicative of this type of attention.  For example, if a firm is investing 
heavily in product innovation and R&D, it is likely that the firm will engage in competitive 
actions that are related to this attention to product development.  These include actions initiated 
by a focal firm, as well as reactive competitive actions that are responses to the behaviors of 
other competitors (Ferrier, 2001).  On the flip side, it can also be expected that a firm that invests 
attention in joint research collaborations (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), the firm will engage in 
higher levels of cooperation in these domains, as well.  Finally, the attention-based view of the 
firm also suggests that organizations tend to continue in existing domains where they previously 
and currently focus attention.  As a result of inertial forces associated with attention, where the 
organization directed its attention in the past is likely to be seen in the present (Ocasio, 2011).  
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As such, this study proposes a positive relationship between previous attention to competitive 






While the attention-based view suggests that focusing attention on competition and 
cooperation will increase the likelihood of these types of actions, this study extends that 
relationship to assess how the attention to and enactment of these actions influences firm 
performance.  A core tenet of the attention-based view of the firm is derived from the concept of 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1947), and the theory suggests that firms have limited amounts of 
attention to direct towards different organizational issues and actions.  This study proposes a 
curvilinear relationship between both competition and cooperation and subsequent firm 
performance due to the inherent attention constraints of the organization.  As a firm increases the 
number of competitive and cooperative behaviors, it is proposed here that the positive 
relationship does not continue infinitely but has diminishing returns.  Bounded rationality and the 
development and application of heuristics both support this argument by suggesting that as a firm 
Figure 1.1:  Research Model 
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tries to direct attention to too many actions and behaviors, the firm will not be able to effectively 
(1) manage the variety of actions and (2) focus and maximize the utility of each type of action of 
the firm. 
While this study contributes to both the competition and cooperation literature by 
identifying organizational attention as an important predictor of these behaviors and how this 
influences performance, it also contributes to the literature by integrating both of these 
phenomena as potentially interdependent behaviors (Chen, 2008).  The logic presented in the 
ambidexterity literature, though often applied to the concepts of exploration and exploitation, 
provide valuable insight into how the balance of what may be seen as conflicting behaviors can 
be mutually beneficial (Lewis, 2000).  Ambidexterity logic proposes that, in order to outperform 
competitors, a firm must balance the demands for new innovation and exploiting existing 
resources and competencies (He & Wong, 2004).  The relationship between exploration and 
exploitation has seen ample attention from researchers (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008); however, 
the logic of ambidexterity and empirical examination of the nature of the relationship between 
competition and cooperation has been scarce.  The present study takes an important first step to 
identifying if and how the balance of competition and cooperation influences a firm’s 
performance through the lens of ambidexterity. 
This study also proposes the relationships between competition and cooperation and 
performance are likely to be influenced by the type or variety of firm actions. For example, as a 
firm engages in a variety of types of actions, these actions may require too much of the firm’s 
limited resources.  As such, the firm’s performance may deteriorate faster with a more diverse 
portfolio of competitive and cooperative actions (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004).  In essence, firms may 
struggle to maximize the value associated with these behaviors due to being stretched too thin.   
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Not only does this study provide an initial empirical examination of competition and cooperation 
balance, it also breaks ground on identifying and testing important contingencies that are likely 
to influence the main effect relationship. 
Based on the previous discussion the purpose of this research is to examine a holistic 
model of organizational attention, how this attention is manifested in firm behaviors, and how 
these behaviors influence a firm’s performance.  As such, the goals of this research can be 
summarized as: 
(1)  Does the attention-based view of the firm predict competitive and cooperative 
actions? 
 
(2)  Does the independent level of competition and cooperation influence firm 
performance? 
 
(3)  Does type of competitive or cooperative action influence the relationship between 
competition/cooperation and performance? 
 




In order to test the relationships and model presented above, this study presents a test of 
organizational attention, nature and number of competitive and cooperative actions, and firm 
performance.  To assess the research model, it is necessary to identify and analyze contexts in 
which competition and cooperation are common behaviors.  As such, the sample is drawn from 
industries characterized by these actions.  The data is collected from a longitudinal sample of 15 
medical device manufacturing firms and 15 oil and gas field services firms across the 10-year 
period ranging from 2003-2013.  This sample provides a unique context in which to study the 
effects of attention and competitive and cooperative behaviors on firm performance.  Content 
analysis is conducted and applied to annual reports as well as news reports, coupled with 
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cooperation data from the SDC Platinum database and financial metrics available from 
Compustat.  Measures used in the study have been derived from existing literature, while new 
measures have also been developed and applied to examine constructs that have yet to be 
empirically assessed in the existing literature.  The relationships within the model are analyzed 
using OLS regression to examine both linear and non-linear relationships. 
Conclusion 
The present study proposes several contributions to both competition and cooperation 
literature, and also contributes to and extends the theoretical bounds of the attention-based view 
of the firm and ambidexterity literature.  First, this study identifies and assesses the potential for 
a curvilinear relationship between both competition and cooperation and subsequent firm 
performance.  It is proposed, based on the concept of bounded rationality and misappropriated 
heuristics (Cyert & March, 1963; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), that attentional constraints of 
the firm limit a firm’s ability to capitalize on competitive and cooperative actions.  It also 
suggests diversity of competitive and cooperative actions as an important moderator of the 
curvilinear relationships proposed.  Second, this study takes an initial examination of how the 
balance between competition and cooperation influences a firm’s performance.  Third, it 
contributes theoretically to both the attention-based view of the firm and also the ambidexterity 
literature.  This study is one of the first to address the organizational attention that is theorized in 
Ocasio’s (1997) initial conceptualization of the attention-based view of the firm.  It also extends 
the logic of ambidexterity to a related domain by translating the insights associated with the 
exploration-exploitation balance to a similar conceptualization of seemingly opposing constructs 
of competition and cooperation (Gupta et al., 2006).  By addressing the questions and 
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relationships proposed in the research model, this study is expected to make theoretical and 
conceptual contributions to the field of strategic management.  
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CHAPTER 2:  THEORY AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
 
 In order to understand the nature of competitive and cooperative behaviors of the firm, it 
is important to understand the theories and logical frameworks that have been applied and 
developed in the separate research domains of competition and cooperation.  It is also important 
to identify and assess the theoretical rationale applied to the existing, but limited, research that 
assesses these two behaviors simultaneously.  The existing literature assessing competition and 
cooperation provides a useful understanding of the state of both domains, and also identifies 
opportunities for future analysis and integration. 
 This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature that identifies the current state of 
both the research on competition and cooperation, as well as an overview of the attention-based 
view and ambidexterity literature.  By coupling the literature associated with competition and 
cooperation with the current state of the attention-based view of the firm and ambidexterity 
literature, this study proposes contributions to both of the research domains of competition and 
cooperation and theory extension and application.  The review leads to the identification of a 
research opportunity that integrates both research domains with new theories that provide the 
logical framework necessary, and appropriate, for understanding how firms manage and 
capitalize on competition and cooperation simultaneously. 
Relevant Competition Literature Overview 
 As one of the central tenets and foundational cornerstones of strategic management 
research, competition has been the focus of ample amounts of scholarly inquiry and analysis 
(Baum & Korn, 1996; Miller, 1996; Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001).  Considering the 
fundamental role competition plays in strategic management, scholars have identified and 
analyzed phenomena from an external perspective, as well as an internal perspective in order to 
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understand the motivations for, and the outcomes of, competitive behavior (Ferrier, 2001; 
Ketchen et al., 2004).  While the phenomenon of competition has been heavily studied, 
numerous opportunities exist to extend, integrate, and contribute to the existing literature.  In this 
section, an overview of the relevant prior research and theoretical logics will be reviewed, 
followed by the identification of opportunities and research objectives addressed by the current 
research study.  The review of the literature is summarized in Table 2.1. 
 From a theoretical perspective, a variety of frameworks and logics have been applied to 
understand the phenomenon of competition.  Many are grounded in internal aspects of the firm 
such as the resource-based view (Barney, 1991) and dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997); however, the dominant theories that have been applied from an external 
perspective have been drawn from areas such as industrial economics (Porter, 1980), game 
theory (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996), and network theory (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998).  While 
these theoretical frameworks are all unique, the majority of recent competition research has 
fallen under the broad umbrella of competitive dynamics—the study of an interactive and 
dynamic exchange of behaviors among rivals (Chen & Miller, 2012). 
Derived from Austrian Economics and work by Schumpeter (1934), competitive 
dynamics are largely motivated by the balance between external demands and internal 
capabilities of the firm.  In essence, competitive dynamics suggests that a competitive advantage 
is a result of factors both internal and external to the firm (Smith et al., 2001).  As a result, firms 
that are able to identify and engage in competitive actions that address external issues, and also 
acquire and manage resources necessary to enact and capitalize on these actions are likely to 
have higher levels of performance (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  While this overview of theories 
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applied to competition provide a foundation of understanding how the research has developed, 
externally and internally oriented theories will be further examined below. 
Competition has been analyzed using a variety of lenses, one of which includes a focus 
on the external factors that influence competitive behaviors of the firm.  At the dawn of strategic 
management, many scholars translated economic concepts and theories to understand how firms 
behave and what provides firms with competitive advantages over peers.  One such broad 
theoretical lens applied is derived from the IO-Economics perspective provided by Porter (1980).  
Work drawing from this theoretical framework identified external factors such as industry 
characteristics and macro-economic conditions that determine the extent to which competitive 
actions would lead to positive performance outcomes (Khanna & Palepu, 2002).  For example, 
industry growth, the presence and concentration of competitors, the nature of industry 
dependencies, and the barriers to entry and exit of the industry defined the landscape and 
competitive conditions firms had to manage in order to survive and thrive among competitors 
(Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 2008; Ferrier, 2001). 
A second theory that has been leveraged that has an externally-oriented scope is found in 
network theory (Tsai, 2002).  In essence, network theory focuses attention on how firms engage 
and manage their relative positioning among peers within a larger network of organizations 
(Gimeno, 2004).  Common themes addressed in this literature include the identification of and 
value capture associated with structural holes, top management team (TMT) social networks, as 
well as the firm’s relative positioning among competitors as key determinants of performance of 
the firm (Ahuja, 2000).  While this research offers valuable insights into competition, it provides 
a relatively deterministic perspective of competition that lacks an understanding of how firm 
characteristics and actions shape competitive advantage.  As firms continue to manage and adapt 
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to external contingencies, theories that address external issues alongside internal factors will be 
critical to understanding the nature of competition as the research within this stream continues to 
develop and grow. 
While research applying IO-Economic principles and theories focuses the lens of 
attention towards the external environment, other theories have focused attention towards the 
internal determinants of competitive behaviors and subsequent performance.  Two such theories 
can be found in the foundational logic of RBV and also research applying insights from dynamic 
capabilities.  RBV proposes that organizations engage in competitive behaviors and develop 
competitive advantages based on the extent to which they are able to acquire and leverage 
valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources (Barney, 1991).  This research has 
been extended by researchers that suggest resource orchestration—the ability to not only possess 
the resources, but also manage them effectively—is an important determinant of a firm’s ability 
to develop and maintain a competitive advantage (Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011).  
Specific to the competition literature, the act of ‘leveraging’ resources from the resource 
orchestration literature supports the notion that internal resources of the firm are tied directly to 
the competitive actions and behaviors of the firm (Ndofor et al., 2011). 
Second, dynamic capabilities extends the internal perspective by addressing how firms 
manage the changing demands of the external environment by adapting their internal 
characteristics to improve the fit between the expectations of the environment and the internal 
resources and structure of the firm (Teece et al., 1997).  Dynamic capabilities research suggests 
that firms are able to develop and change their resources to maintain a competitive advantage 
over peers (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles, & Peteraf, 2009).  As firms alter their resource structuring 
and application, they are able to enact competitive actions and develop or maintain a competitive 
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advantage (Sirmon, Hitt, Arregle, & Campbell, 2010).  While internally and externally oriented 
theories have been applied to understand competition and performance of the firm, recent work 
has sought to focus on a more integrative approach to understanding the competition-
performance relationship. 
Competitive dynamics represents a broad domain of research that examines the 
interaction of the internal and external environment on competition.  One of the core elements of 
competitive dynamics is the identification and analysis of tacit competitive actions.  The unit of 
analysis has shifted from the IO Economics analysis of industry or strategic group 
characteristics, and focused more attention on understanding the specific competitive actions and 
reactions that firms implement (Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller & Chen, 1994; Smith, Grimm, & 
Gannon, 1992).  By identifying and analyzing the specific actions of the firm, researchers have 
focused the lens of research on a behavior that can be uniquely assessed in terms of how it relates 
to both internal firm characteristics like attention and external factors, as well.  In other words, 
actions of the firm can be identified based on internal motivations and capabilities, but also how 
these actions are manifested and the subsequent implications and outcomes that are realized in 
the external environment (Parmar et al., 2010).  These can be actions that spawn reactions of 
other firms, or they can provide the firm with a stronger relative positioning in terms of market 
positioning and market share (Derfus et al., 2008; Tsai, Su, & Chen, 2011).  Also, the actions 
enacted by the firm are likely manifestations of a firm’s intended strategies and the direction in 
which the firm intends to propel the organization (Andrews, 1971).  By shifting the analysis of 
competition from purely external contingencies or internal capabilities, developing and applying 
research that focuses on the actions of firms provides a strong operationalization of how internal 
and external factors relate to one another.  
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 This study seeks to extend competition research and the competitive dynamics domain by 
applying the attention-based view of the firm and logic from the ambidexterity literature.  ABV 
captures elements of the external and internal environment by identifying the issues 
(environmental factors) that the organization directs attention (a finite internal factor) towards, 
and how this attention is manifested in tacit and identifiable firm behaviors (Ocasio, 1997).  
Second, ambidexterity provides a strong logical framework that can shed light on how 
competition may have an interactive relationship with a related yet contradictory behavior such 
as cooperation (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008).  The logical tenets of ambidexterity provide a 
strong foundation that identifies the paradoxical nature of actions and how these actions may be 
interdependent rather than independent. 
 This study contributes to the current literature by extending this perspective of 
competition as a dynamic interaction of internal and external factors.  By analyzing the 
competitive actions of the firm, this study captures specific and tangible behaviors of the firm 
that are a result of a firm’s internal processes and external contingencies that influence the 
effectiveness of these actions.  Also, by analyzing a similar phenomenon—cooperation—
simultaneously, this study provides cross-disciplinary contributions that can bridge a gap 
between two types of actions often discussed, yet seldom assessed, simultaneously.  The 
following section provides a similar review of the existing cooperation literature, as well as 
proposes possible integration between the two domains of research. 
Relevant Cooperation Literature Review 
 A second pillar on which the foundation of strategic management is set can be found in 
the research on cooperation.  Interorganizational relationships (IORs) have also seen a variety of 
theoretical frameworks applied within the overarching domain of cooperation.  By leveraging 
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multiple theories and addressing unique cooperative actions, from the motivations of cooperation 
to the implications and outcomes associated with interorganizational relationships, cooperation 
research has provided numerous valuable contributions to strategic management.  Similar to the 
competition literature, cooperation research has flourished and continues to grow; however, there 
also exist opportunities to extend our knowledge associated with how cooperation is managed 
and influences firm performance.  The review of the cooperation literature is summarized in 
Table 2.2. 
Theories that address the cooperation among firms have largely been derived from 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) (Barney, 1991; 
Williamson, 1981).  Within each of these domains, separate theoretical streams have developed 
such as agency theory within TCE, and knowledge-based view of the firm within the RBV 
perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989; Grant, 1996).  While these theories address the unique elements 
associated with specific IORs, research focusing on portfolios of cooperative relationships of 
firms has also developed.  This portfolio perspective is largely grounded in social network 
theory, and also organizational learning literature (Ahuja, 2000; Deeds & Hill, 1996).  The 
history of theoretical frameworks applied to cooperative behaviors of the firm will be briefly 
discussed and reviewed below. 
 Since cooperation research necessitates the existence and interaction of at least two firms, 
researchers have identified, applied, and extended theories that capture the motivation for and 
nature of cooperation among firms.  Like the theory applied in the competition literature, early 
foundational work in cooperation translated economic principles and theories to the strategic 
management context as a starting point for the relatively new field of inquiry.  The main example 
of this is found in the application and development of transaction cost theory (TCT) in strategic 
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management research (Williamson, 1981).  At the core of TCT is the ‘make-or-buy’ decision 
which—in the context of cooperation—is defined by the expected and realized costs associated 
with engaging in cooperation with another organization (Masten & Saussier, 2000).  Cooperation 
offers firms an alternative to the market or hierarchy with more control than purely market 
transactions but also less control than bringing the behavior completely into the firm (Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006). 
TCT research has provided a strong foundation that has commonly been leveraged to 
explore the nature of dyadic relationships, and scholars that have applied this theoretical 
framework have provided invaluable contributions to the field’s understanding of (1) what 
motivates transacting relationships among firms and (2) rich insights into the inner workings 
associated with specific relationships between organizations (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 
2011).  The main focus of this research has been used to understand the unique elements and 
factors associated with specific relationships.  For example, researchers have assessed how 
organizations identify, engage, and manage relationships based on similarities, costs, and 
ambiguity within the relationship and the overall environment (David & Han, 2004).  A 
subsidiary theoretical framework of TCT that has been applied to cooperation is found in agency 
theory (Kim & Mahoney, 2005).  Like TCT, agency theory is often leveraged in contexts that are 
specific to individual relationships between firms, and assesses the extent to which agency costs 
shape relationships and develop over time (Blair & Lafontaine, 2005).  While these two 
theoretical frameworks are often applied, the focus of these theories is on the individual 
relationships, rather than the nature of a firm’s overall cooperative activity.  
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Table 2.2:  Cooperation Literature 
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 TCT and agency theory provide rich insights into the details associated with individual 
dyadic relationships; however, other theoretical frameworks have been leveraged that assess a 
broader level of cooperation of the firm.  Rather than focusing solely on the intricacies associated 
within dyadic relationships, theories such as RBV, knowledge-based view of the firm, and 
network theory have been applied to understand why and how firms engage in multiple 
cooperative engagements simultaneously.  RBV and the knowledge-based view of the firm, 
suggest that firms engage in interorganizational relationships to acquire and/or develop core 
competencies to create and capture value for the firm (Poppo & Zenger, 1998; Rivera-Santos & 
Inkpen, 2009).  While the focus of RBV is broader and captures diverse resources, the 
knowledge-based view of the firm focuses on understanding how firms go about acquiring and 
leveraging knowledge resources and human capital as a means of developing competitive 
advantages (Van Wijk, Jansen, & Lyles, 2008).  These two theories focus attention inward when 
determining what motivates a firm to engage in cooperate activity, and doesn’t necessarily 
address the management of a firm’s holistic cooperative engagements. 
Rather than focusing on the internal nature of cooperative activity, network theory has 
largely focused on an external or structural approach to understanding cooperative action 
(Borgatti & Foster, 2003).  Network theory has assessed cooperative actions of organizations and 
examines the extent to which a firm’s positioning within a network of organizations influences 
performance (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003).  Research applying network theory often assesses 
performance at the network level, and often lacks the insights associated with firm-level research 
by focusing at the network-level of analysis of cooperation (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011).  
RBV, knowledge-based view of the firm, and network theory represent three theoretical 
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frameworks that have focused attention on cooperation beyond the dyad and provide a strong 
foundation for other areas of inquiry such as alliance portfolio research. 
 As a relatively new substream within the cooperation literature, alliance portfolio 
research has become quickly established as a research topic partly due to the appropriate and 
strong application of theory to the phenomenon of interest (Wassmer, 2010).  Within the alliance 
portfolio management literature studies have focused on understanding how a firm’s position in a 
network lends itself to a better competitive advantage relative to peers due to access to resources, 
knowledge, markets, among numerous other network-derived benefits (Baum, Calabrese, & 
Silverman, 2000; Capaldo, 2007; Goerzen, 2007).  A second focal area of research has been 
targeted at understanding how firms capture the value associated with multiple different 
cooperative relationships.  Falling under the domain of organizational learning, this research has 
sought to shed light on how firms can create and capture value from a holistic perspective in 
terms of alliance portfolio management (Lavie, 2007).  Again, this research focuses on 
understanding how resources, both within the firm and through IORs, are critical to the success 
of the organization.  While these fall under the broad domain of cooperation research, these 
subcategories within cooperation research focus understanding how firms manage the entire set 
of IORs rather than the unique characteristics of individual relationships between firms. 
 While portfolio research has been relatively popular within recent years, many 
opportunities to extend the literature exist.  While early stage research examined the implications 
of size of cooperative portfolios, many researchers have suggested these studies have merely 
scratched the surface with other opportunities to explore how the size of a portfolio is managed 
by the firm (Deeds & Hill, 1996; Goerzen, 2007).  By extending this research to address 
potential curvilinear effects, and also examining internal and external factors simultaneously, this 
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study offers a valuable and insightful contribution to the existing literature.  Also, many of the 
theories applied to the cooperative activity of firms have been limited to understanding what 
motivates a firm to engage in cooperation, or the way firms manage individual cooperative 
engagements.  The proposed study extends cooperation research by leveraging attention-based 
view of the firm and theoretical insights from the ambidexterity literature to explore if a firm 
manages multiple cooperative engagements simultaneously, and if attention influences a firm’s 
ability to capture value from their cooperative portfolio. 
Attention Based View of the Firm 
 The attention-based view of the firm (ABV) is a theoretical framework aimed broadly at 
understanding the nature of attention within the firm and how this influences a firm’s decisions 
and actions (Ocasio, 1997).  This theoretical approach focuses on answering how, why, when, 
and who within the organization addresses specific issues, and how the firm’s attention to these 
issues results in subsequent activity (Ocasio, 2011).  One of the core tenets that is particularly 
relevant to understanding firm behavior lies in the concept of bounded rationality, which posits 
that firms have limited amounts of attention that can be leveraged at any given time (Cyert & 
March, 1963).  Since attention of the firm and individuals within the firm are finite resources, the 
actions firms enact are likely to be strongly related to the issues the firm chooses to focus 
attention towards (Sapienza, De Clercq, & Sandberg, 2005).  Below, a brief summary of research 
leveraging the attention-based view of the firm is summarized, followed by how it provides a 
relevant and appropriate framework for understanding competitive and cooperative actions of the 
firm. 
 In Ocasio’s (1997) seminal work establishing and developing the attention-based view of 
the firm, he proposed that the structuring and direction of attention of the firm represents a 
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critical and centrally important predictor of firm behavior (Simon, 1947).  By reengaging and 
reviving earlier concepts of structure and cognition, the ABV perspective establishes attention at 
the organizational level and suggests that organizational attention—as manifested in the patterns 
of attention directed by managers—is a strong predictor of firm actions (Ren & Guo, 2011).  The 
three focal elements of ABV are: 
(1) The focus of attention—what issues are being identified and engaged by 
managers? 
 
(2) Situated attention—how does context (or other factors) influence what issues 
receive attention? 
 
(3) Structural distribution of attention—how do resources, rules, and control 
within the organization influence the allocation of attention and subsequent 
enactment of behaviors? 
 
While these three elements represent the holistic model associated with ABV, traditionally 
researchers have focused on identifying elements of each subcategory in order to understand firm 
behavior (Rerup, 2009).  For example, research applying ABV has often leveraged letters to 
shareholders as being indicative of issues and topics that the firm is focusing attention towards 
and hoping to address with subsequent firm actions. 
 While previous empirical research has provided valuable insight about how attention 
influences firm decisions, opportunities to extend the literature still exist.  One such opportunity 
exists in the empirical examination of organizational level attention (Cho & Hambrick, 2006).  
Previous research has largely focused on assessing and analyzing the attention associated with 
individuals within the firm, rather than assessing the firm’s overall allocation of attention 
(Kaplan, 2008).  While previous research applying ABV has traditionally focused on assessing 
individual level measurement of attention (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009), the future of ABV lies in the 
integration and simultaneous assessment of individual and organizational level attention (Ocasio 
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& Joseph, 2005).  By focusing attention on how organizational attention is manifested in actions 
and its subsequent influence on performance, this study provides valuable contributions to the 
ABV literature. 
 This study also makes a strong contribution and extends the ABV literature by integrating 
and analyzing tangible and relevant outcome variables.  Previous research leveraging ABV has 
traditionally only assessed the extent to which attention influences firm actions (Ocasio, 2011).  
While this is a useful contribution to the literature and offers strong insights as to how firms 
behave, it lacks a stronger connection to the strategic management research at large.  This study 
proposes a mediated relationship between attention and firm performance—a dependent variable 
that lies at the core of strategic management (Nag et al., 2007).  By empirically assessing the 
proposed research model, this study provides a strong link between ABV and the broader field of 
strategic management. 
Ambidexterity 
 The concept of organizational ambidexterity has become a popular topic of study for 
management scholars.  Since the seminal work by March (1991), researchers have focused on 
understanding the unique relationship between exploration and exploitation behaviors of the 
firm.  Exploration behaviors are identified and generally defined as behaviors focused on 
learning and/or innovating, whereas exploitation behaviors are traditionally viewed as behaviors 
that leverage or apply previous knowledge, resources, or skills (March, 1991).  While this 
balance of exploration and exploitation is the domain in which the concept of ambidexterity was 
born, the logic and rationale behind ambidexterity can be leveraged in the unique context of how 
firms manage and balance cooperation and competitive actions, as well. 
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 In terms of parallels, the exploration-exploitation balance is closely related to the 
discussion that exists in the current literature in regards to competition and cooperation.  Namely, 
researchers are interested in studying and understanding the extent to which competitive and 
cooperative activity are related, and if they are related, to what extent.  In essence, the question 
still remains as to whether competition and cooperation are loosely related to each other, or if 
these two actions are mutually exclusive (Park, Srivastava, & Gnyawali, 2013).  This debate 
strongly parallels the discussions that have been applied in the exploration-exploitation realm 
(Gupta et al., 2006).  Questions regarding the extent to which competition and cooperation exist 
on two ends of a continuum or exist as orthogonal constructs that are relatively independent of 
each other continue to be identified as critical future research opportunities but have yet to attract 
thorough empirical analysis (Chen, 2008). 
 A second parallel exists between the two literatures in terms of the sequencing or balance 
associated with competition and cooperation.  For example, what levels and types of competitive 
and cooperative actions are likely to yield the highest levels of firm performance?  How do 
external contingencies influence the “appropriate” balance that optimizes performance in a given 
context?  These questions continue to permeate the ambidexterity literature, and again have a 
clear similarity to the debate and discussion within the cooperation and competition literature 
(Benner & Tushman, 2003; Burgelman, 2002; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009).  
The need for both competition and cooperation has received ample support in each independent 
domain; however, the need for integration and the understanding of how the firm should balance 
these actions simultaneously or sequentially represents a critical question that can only be 




 The application of ambidexterity to the proposed study is not to examine the debate 
between exploration and exploitation.  The purpose of applying ambidexterity to the proposed 
study is to leverage the underlying logic associated with research in the ambidexterity literature.  
As such, this study focuses on understanding the foundational elements of ambidexterity—the 
concept of paradox, and the balance of paradoxical behaviors—in the context of competition and 
cooperation.  While ambidexterity has been limited to exploration and exploitation, the proposed 
study makes a first step in translating the logic associated with ambidexterity to a new context.  
By applying the concepts of paradox and the balance associated with managing potentially 
conflicting behaviors to the competition/cooperation phenomenon, this study extends and 
strengthens the existing ambidexterity literature. 
Integration of Theory and Phenomena 
 The study being proposed here provides contributions and integration of unique domains 
of research, and it also extends and tests the theories discussed above.  The research model 
presented answers a call to research for integration of competition and cooperation, while also 
applying and extending new theories to the phenomenon of interest.  By integrating the related 
yet independent research streams of competition and cooperation, this research provides an 
initial framework for examining these two types of phenomena simultaneously (Chen, 2008).  
Also, this study applies, integrates, and extends the theoretical insights that can be drawn from 
the growing literature on the attention-based view of the firm and the study of organizational 
ambidexterity. 
Having assessed the historical development of competition and cooperation literatures, as 
well as providing an overview of the attention-based view of the firm and the ambidexterity 
literature, the focus of the following section is to integrate the theoretical frameworks with the 
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phenomena being assessed.  Previous discussions identified the gaps within each specific 
domain; however, the focus of this section is to identify how the proposed study fits with and 
contributes to each research stream, while discussing and assessing how this research integrates 
elements from each area to fit the overall research model.  This study proposes new contributions 
to competition and cooperation, while simultaneously extending the application of ABV and the 
logic found in the ambidexterity literature to new phenomena. 
 In order to explain how the proposed study plans to contribute to the literature, it is best 
to review the gaps that were identified in previous sections as well as the current state of research 
in each domain.  First, this study seeks to contribute to both competition and cooperation 
literatures by empirically assessing the extent to which firm actions are shaped by where and 
how a firm directs attention towards issues.  Research addressing how attention influences the 
competitive and cooperative behaviors and subsequent performance of the firm represents a 
strong contribution by integrating a key predictor of how firms manage and attend to competitive 
and cooperative issues.  This integrative contribution extends the application of ABV, while also 
providing a strong theoretical framework for understanding competitive and cooperative 
behaviors of the firm simultaneously.  By integrating insights from ABV and ambidexterity 
research, this study provides a unique perspective that assesses internal and external factors 
associated with competitive and cooperative actions simultaneously.  This holistic model aligns 
well with the recent trends in the development of ABV and ambidexterity, as well as the 
continuing development of competitive and cooperative research.  Table 2.3 provides a brief 





Table 2.3:  Literature Summary 
Topic Prior Research Topics Current and Future Research 
Topics 
Competition Environmental characteristics, 
industry characteristics, resources 
of the firm, management of 
resources of the firm 
Competitive behaviors, 
integration of internal and 
external factors, potential 
interactions with cooperation 
   
Cooperation Dyadic relationships, relationship 
issues (costs, negotiations, 
contracts, etc.), network 
structure, network positioning 
Alliance portfolios, 
integrating micro-elements 
into cooperation research, 
potential interactions with 
competition 
   
Attention-Based View of 
the Firm 
Individual attention to 
identifiable behaviors, how 
attention focus shapes behaviors, 
attention manifested in 
organization structure 
Identifying relationships 
between individual attention 
and organizational factors or 
outcomes, application to more 
holistic models 
   
Ambidexterity Exploration and exploitation, 
variation of focus on exploration 
or exploitation influencing 
performance, industry 
characteristics 
Examining the nature of the 
relationship between 
paradoxical behaviors, 
extension to new domains 
 
In terms of contributions to competition and cooperation, this research makes 
contributions to both research streams independently but also integratively.  From a competitive 
dynamics perspective this research proposes an empirical examination of potential curvilinear 
effects associated with competition, and it continues within the existing research by examining 
specific actions overall as indicative of the firm’s competitive strategies (Ketchen et al., 2004).  
From a cooperative research perspective this research again fits into the current literature by 
addressing the cooperative behaviors of the firm overall and moves beyond dyadic relationships 
to understand how firms’ cooperative behaviors influence performance (Wassmer, 2010).  
Finally, the proposed research also identifies the balance of competition and cooperation as an 
important starting point to understanding the nature of the relationship of competitive and 
cooperative activity, and also the extent to which this balance influences performance 
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(Bengtsson & Kock, 2014).  The contributions to each area of research are discussed below, 
followed by how this study proposes integrating the phenomena of interest with the theoretical 
frameworks being leveraged. 
Specific to the competition literature, researchers have called for a stronger integration of 
micro issues (like attention) to further understand how and why firms engage in competitive 
behaviors.  By leveraging ABV, this study proposes not only cross-disciplinary contributions by 
integrating cooperation as a potentially conflicting demand for the finite attention of the firm 
(Cyert & March, 1963), but also integrating micro-level concepts as critical determinants in a 
firm’s competitive and cooperative decision-making (Chen, 2008).  Further, this study 
contributes to the competition literature by looking at antecedents and outcomes of competitive 
behaviors simultaneously.  As a holistic model, this study seeks to determine how competition is 
enacted based on the direction of attention of organizational members and how this influences 
the firm’s ability to gain and/or sustain a competitive advantage. 
Specific to the cooperation literature, this study extends the growing literature on 
assessing a firm’s cooperative behaviors at the firm level as opposed to the dyad level.  By 
positioning this study in the existing literature that examines a firm’s cooperative actions 
holistically (Wassmer, 2010), it fits well within the current discussion while also integrating 
competition as a potential factor that may influence the extent to which a firm is able to engage 
in and capture value associated with cooperation.  ABV provides a unique and strong theoretical 
lens to understanding how a firm directs and manages attention to cooperation, and how this 
attention to cooperation influences cooperative actions and subsequent performance.  Also, the 
logic and theoretical framework presented in the ambidexterity literature provides insight as to 
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how competition and cooperation as seemingly paradoxical behaviors may have interactive 
effects on each other.  These theories are discussed in further detail below. 
The attention-based view of the firm has been leveraged to understand how the focus of 
finite attention influences firm actions.  Previous research leveraging the attention-based view of 
the firm has largely focused on understanding how attention influences behaviors (Ocasio, 
2011); however, this study tests that relationship while also extending the relationship to include 
performance implications, as well.  By integrating these moderating effects, it provides a 
stronger representation of how attention directly impacts an organization’s behaviors and 
indirectly impacts performance.  The proposed study also extends the ABV literature by 
empirically assessing the concept of bounded rationality and the finite nature of attention within 
the firm.  This study provides an initial attempt to assess how attentional limitations affect firm 
performance.  It also examines the performance implications associated with the development 
and management of heuristics.  By applying the attention-based view to the context of 
competition and cooperation, this study contributes to the growing literature that integrates micro 
and macro concepts to more holistically understand phenomena. 
 While the above discussion explains how this study contributes to the domains of 
competition and cooperation individually, the study also makes integrative contributions that are 
informed by the logic proposed in the ambidexterity literature.  The attention-based view 
provides the theoretical foundation for the individual competitive and cooperative elements of 
the research model; however, ambidexterity serves as the binding logic that integrates the two 
types of actions and suggests that these two divergent actions may be related (March, 1991).  
While ambidexterity has traditionally been applied to exploration and exploitation, many of the 
logical rationales and frameworks applied in the exploration-exploitation debate have parallels 
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with the discussion involving competition and cooperation.  As discussed in the previous section, 
the questions revolving around the ambidexterity literature about the nature of exploration and 
exploitation strongly parallel the issues and questions that plague the competition and 
cooperation literatures (Gupta et al., 2006).  For example, are competition and cooperation 
mutually exclusive, or relatively independent and orthogonal?  By leveraging the theoretical 
insights from ambidexterity, this study contributes and extends the ambidexterity to a similar 
context while simultaneously providing the theoretical foundation for the integration of 




CHAPTER 3:  HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 While the focus of the previous chapters is to (1) outline the overall scope of the 
proposed study and (2) offer a background of extant competition and cooperation research and 
theory that might shed new light into this research, the purpose of the current chapter is to 
leverage the theory to offer specific hypotheses.  Specifically, the purpose is to (1) identify the 
nature of the relationships being examined, and (2) explain and apply the theory, logic, and prior 
research that support the relationships being proposed and assessed.  By integrating and applying 
insights discussed previously, this chapter provides the necessary link between theory and 
phenomena to support the research model. 
 To recall, the questions and issues identified in the earlier sections focused on 
understanding the nature of competition and cooperation within the firm, and how these two 
types of actions independently and integratively influence firm performance.  The driving 
theoretical frameworks being leveraged to understand the dynamics associated with these 
seemingly paradoxical actions are drawn from the attention based view and the ambidexterity 
literature.  By examining this holistic model of attention of the organization, the behavioral 
results of where this attention is focused and directed, and also the performance implications of 
these actions, the proposed model addresses the following questions: 
(1)  Does the attention-based view of the firm predict competitive and cooperative 
actions? 
 
(2)  Does the independent level of competition and cooperation influence firm 
performance? 
 
(3)  Does diversity of competitive or cooperative action influence the relationship 
between competition/cooperation and performance? 
 








Attention’s Influence on Actions 
 Examining the effects of attention on actions of individuals and organizations has long 
been a popular topic of inquiry for both micro and macro scholars in the field of management 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Sullivan, 2010).  The cognitive nature of attention within the firm lends 
itself to a unique context where integration of micro and macro factors provides a rich 
explanation of how and why firms engage in certain behaviors.  Attention is represented by the 
extent to which firms and individuals dedicate time and effort on issues and answers associated 
with characteristics of the firm and environment (Ocasio, 1997).  The attention based view of the 
firm posits that the three key elements to understanding the relationship between attention and 
actions lie in (1) the focus of attention—issues and answers that receive attention are likely to be 
acted on, (2) the way attention is situated—contextual and situational features determine how 
attention is applied, and (3) the structural nature of attention—how a firm is structured or 
situated among peers influences the extent to which different issues and answers attract attention 
and subsequent action.  While research has examined the separate elements of ABV, the current 
Figure 3.1: Research Model, Reviewed 
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study seeks to understand how (1) the focus of attention and (2) the situated nature of attention 
relative to competition and cooperation shape competitive and cooperative activity, while 
controlling for the effects of structural characteristics of attention within the organization. 
 The attention based view has been leveraged in a variety of studies with the intention of 
understanding how focusing attention on certain issues and answers result in firm actions related 
to a given phenomenon.  Much of the research has been conducted at the executive level of the 
organization, and focused on understanding how managerial attention determines the firm’s 
behaviors (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Ocasio & Joseph, 2008).  While these studies provide a 
unique perspective on how firm actions are influenced by executive attention, it often fails to 
connect the attention of the organization and its members to the actions of the organization.  
Rather than solely examining how executives influence a firm’s actions, the current study 
extends the attention-based view to ascertain the extent to which an organization focuses the 
attention of its organizational members on competition and cooperation to understand what types 
of actions are enacted by the firm.  Also, while previous research has focused on understanding 
the effects of executive attention on individual actions, little research has focused on the limited 
nature of attention by empirically assessing the extent to which related actions are dependent on 
overall attention within the organization.  For example, previous research has empirically 
assessed the extent to which executive attention influences a firm’s focus on new technologies 
(Eggers & Kaplan, 2009), the attention-based view also supports a broader perspective which 
suggests that the attention of organizational members overall will also likely shape firm actions. 
Research at both the micro and macro levels has focused on understanding the extent to 
which attention and allocation of resources shapes the actions of an organization and its 
members.  For example, research in the micro literature supports the notion that focusing 
38 
 
attention on specific goals leads to actions associated with achieving these goals (Locke & 
Latham, 2002).  In this context, competition and cooperation represent the overarching goal, and 
the focus on these actions will likely lead to the enactment of competitive and cooperative 
actions.  From the macro context, researchers have also supported the power of attention 
influencing firm activity.  By focusing attention on future-oriented actions, organizations that 
identify and focus on new concepts and phenomena are able to overcome the potentially negative 
consequences of organizational inertia (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995).  Also from the macro 
literature on attention, research suggests that continuous focus on both new and existing 
heuristics influences the enactment of behaviors in related domains (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006).  
Levinthal and Rerup (2006) have also suggested a strong relationship between the focus of 
attention and the subsequent enactment of related behaviors.  They suggest that organizations 
that maintain attentional vigilance—defined as ‘mindfulness’—are likely to engage in more 
effective actions than organizations that ignore changing contexts and environments.  This 
positive relationship between attention and subsequent action is consistent with the original 
formulation of the attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997).  While the competitive and cooperative 
behaviors of the firm represent two independent behaviors that firms can focus attention towards, 
this study proposes that attention to competition and cooperation will be positively related to 
competitive and cooperative behaviors, respectively.  Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 1a:  Attention to competition is positively related to the enactment of 
competitive actions. 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  Attention to cooperation is positively related to the enactment of 
cooperative actions. 
 
 Attention to competitive and cooperative action represents an interdependent 
phenomenon and likely falls on a continuum within the firm since these actions draw from the 
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same finite attention of the firm.  Also, research in the ambidexterity literature suggests 
organizational resource constraints present a challenge when seeking to effectively manage 
seemingly contradictory behaviors (Jansen, Simsek, & Cao, 2012).  By pairing the attention-
based view with ambidexterity, these two theoretical streams support the limiting effects 
associated with a finite cognitive resource of the firm such as the attention of members within the 
organization.  While this study proposes this single continuum perspective for attention, the 
actions themselves are proposed to be independent of each other.  Considering the nature of 
attention and the limited amount of attention firms possess (Ocasio, 1997), this study proposes an 
inherent tradeoff associated with devoting attention to the two seemingly paradoxical actions.  
For instance, if attention is directed towards cooperative engagements and increasing the 
relationships with other organizations, it is likely at the expense of focusing attention on 
competitive actions of the firm.  For example, Navis & Glynn (2011) analyzed the relationship 
between satellite radio providers XM and Sirius as satellite radio gained legitimacy in the 
market.  Their findings suggested that competition and cooperation occurred sequentially rather 
than simultaneously due to the conflicting nature of these two actions within the firm.  In early 
stages, the relationship was characterized by cooperation, whereas once the market was 
established, the competitive actions became the focus of the organizations’ attention.  While 
attention can be directed at both competition and cooperation, the argument presented in the 
attention-based view literature on the finite nature of attention suggests that these behaviors are 
at odds in competition for the same attention (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006).  As such, this study 
proposes a negative relationship between attention to competition and cooperative behaviors, and 
a negative relationship between attention to cooperation and competitive actions.  By directing 
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and focusing attention towards one activity, the firm is using resources at the expense of being 
able to direct the resources towards the opposite type of action.  Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 2a:  Attention to competition is negatively related to the enactment of 
cooperative actions. 
Hypothesis 2b:  Attention to cooperation is negatively related to the enactment of 
competitive actions. 
 
Actions’ Influence on Performance 
From the above discussion, it is proposed that firm actions are indicative of where a 
firm’s managers direct their focus and attention (Simon, 1947).  As a firm’s attention is directed 
at actions such as cooperation, it is likely that the firm will extract value when they focus on 
maximizing the returns from interorganizational relationships.  By increasing cooperative 
actions, it suggests the firm is aware of the need for relationships as a means of developing and 
maintaining a competitive advantage (Das & Teng, 1998).  While engaging in cooperative 
agreements are a means through which organizations can gain access to resources, many 
cooperative engagements may result in diminishing returns or even yield negative returns for the 
organization (Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 2012).  These diminishing results are a result 
of two factors that influence a firm’s ability to capitalize on increased cooperative engagements. 
First, within the same cognition literature from which the attention based view originates, 
organizational learning literature supports the notion that organizations improve in their ability to 
manage more engagements the more they have managed similar situations in the past (Haleblian 
& Finkelstein, 1999).  Within the learning literature, researchers have found that organizations—
and specifically managers within organizations—are able to leverage prior experiences and 
behaviors to improve their ability to capture value associated with cooperative engagements 
(Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002).  By overcoming this “learning curve,” organizations are able to 
more rapidly integrate core resources, manage the processes of cooperation, and create and 
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capture value for the firm by improving the firm’s performance (Von Hippel, 1998).  Specific to 
the context of cooperation, Rindova and  Kotha (2001) conducted an in-depth case analysis of 
Yahoo! which identified heuristics and organizational learning as a key factor in the firm’s 
ability to continuously develop and maintain a competitive advantage through cooperative 
engagements.  By managing a consistent heuristic for alliance formation, Yahoo! was able to 
adapt and manage the dynamic external environment effectively. 
While this literature supports the notion that individuals are able to more quickly apply 
existing heuristics from previous experience, there is also research that supports the notion of 
misappropriation of these heuristics (Bingham, Eisenhardt, & Furr, 2007).  Researchers have 
identified multiple characteristics of the environment that decrease the effectiveness of previous 
experience such as situational similarity, market turbulence, and other externally derived factors 
that can have a negative relationship with the effectiveness of heuristics and organizational 
learning (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2007).  While research in organizational learning 
supports the notion that firms can improve their cooperative performance with experience and 
volume, researchers have also found that routinization, excess structure in heuristics, and the lack 
of attention towards new engagements may prove to hinder a firm’s ability to continue capturing 
value from cooperative engagements (Siggelkow, 2001) . 
Second, consistent with the attention-based view of the firm, organizations have a limited 
amount of attention that can be directed towards different strategies, actions, and issues of the 
firm (Ocasio, 1997).  As organizations continue engaging in cooperative engagements with other 
firms, individuals within an organization are likely to devote less attention to the new 
relationships and apply previously developed heuristics to managing the cooperative 
relationships (Miner, Bassof, & Moorman, 2001).  While this lack of effort to apply attention to 
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the cooperation may hurt the organization, there may be a sheer lack of attention available to 
dedicate to the new cooperative engagements in the midst of other cooperative relationships. 
While ABV predicts the relationship between attention and actions, it also provides a 
framework for understanding how actions mediate the relationship between attention to 
competition and cooperation and subsequent firm performance.  In essence, the actions of the 
firm represent a manifestation of where a firm directs attention, and the performance is a direct 
outcome of these tangible and identifiable firm actions.  This indirect curvilinear relationship that 
assesses attention to cooperation, cooperative actions, and firm performance is well supported by 
concepts of organizational learning (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999).  In the specific context of 
cooperation, as a firm increases the number of cooperative actions, it may become too much for 
the organization to manage effectively.  Also, as firms become complacent in long-term 
relationships, firms may not be able to capitalize on these relationships as much as they could 
when the firm had more attention to devote to the cooperative engagement (Park et al., 2013).  
As such, it is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 3a:  Cooperative actions are positively related to firm performance; however, at 
a certain point these benefits begin to diminish. 
 
 This study also proposes a similar curvilinear relationship between competitive actions 
and firm performance.  Drawing from the attention based view of the firm and the assumption 
that firms are only able to manage and leverage a certain number of competitive actions 
effectively without diminishing returns (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006).  From an external 
perspective, researchers have heavily studied the motivations and outcomes of competitive 
behaviors within the competitive dynamics literature (Chen, Kuo-Hsien, & Tsai, 2007; Ferrier, 
2001).  While this research has identified non-linear relationships with performance as a 
possibility due to increased competition, battles for market share, and leveraging multiple attacks 
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against competitors (Baum & Korn, 1999), research addressing potential curvilinear effects from 
an internal perspective has been limited.  Traditionally drawing from the resource based view, 
studies examining internal factors often focus on understanding either how resources shape firm 
actions, or how resources and resource management influence performance (Sirmon et al., 2011).  
Research within this perspective also suggests that organizations need to focus attention on core 
competencies and focus on doing a few things great as opposed to a variety of things poorly 
(Miller, 1993b; Miller & Chen, 1996).  Unique to this study, the attention based view provides a 
compelling theoretical framework for understanding both the motivations for enacted behaviors, 
and the subsequent relationship with firm performance. 
Again referencing the finite nature of attention available to the firm, this study proposes a 
curvilinear relationship between competitive behaviors and firm performance due to resource 
constraints of the firm and the firm’s ability to effectively manage a large number of competitive 
behaviors.  On one hand, too few competitive behaviors become routinized and are not given the 
necessary attention to be appropriately leveraged, while on the other hand managing too many 
competitive behaviors may be detrimental to firm performance as well (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004; 
March, 1991).  For example, Miller and Chen (1996) analyzed firm competitive action 
repertoires and found that the performance implications associated with the simplicity of a firm’s 
competitive repertoire might be contingent upon the demands of the environment.  In their study 
of the airline industry—a dynamic and competitive environment—the results of competitive 
action simplicity were mixed.  In their externally focused analysis, the effectiveness of 
competitive repertoire simplicity was contingent on the nature of the industry.  From an internal 
perspective, the results may also be a result of misappropriation of attention, or a lack of 
available attention to devote to the changing externalities faced by the firm.  Members of the 
44 
 
organization may become overwhelmed and not be able to truly focus attention on the behaviors 
to create and sustain the competitive advantage necessary to outperform competitors.  Second, by 
stretching the firm’s resources with a large number of competitive actions, organizations may 
misappropriate attention and sacrifice effectively managing a few competitive behaviors for 
poorly executing more competitive actions.  This builds directly off of previous literature that 
suggest managerial factors are likely to influence the likelihood of a firm’s ability to effectively 
leverage a competitive repertoire (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004).  By being stretched too thin, the 
organization may not be able to reap the benefits of high levels of competitive activity.  As such 
it is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 3b:  Competitive actions are positively related to firm performance; however, 
at a certain point these benefits begin to diminish. 
 
 While the direct effects between competition and cooperation and subsequent 
performance represent meaningful relationships when examined with an attention based view 
and ambidexterity, this study also proposes moderation of these relationships based on the same 
theoretical frameworks.  The previous hypotheses examine the argument that higher levels of 
competition and cooperation may be difficult for firms to appropriately and effectively manage.  
In essence, the arguments presented suggest that the volume of actions may become too large for 
the firm to capture the value associated with the given actions.  While previous research has 
traditionally examined the volume or variety of behaviors in relation to performance (Wassmer, 
2010), this study proposes an integrative model that examines both the number and diversity of 
actions as important factors to be addressed when examining the relationship between actions 
and performance.  This provides a more holistic understanding of how competitive repertoire and 
cooperative portfolio volume and variety interactively influence firm performance.  Second, 
whereas previous research examining these two types of actions has had limited theoretical 
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backing, this study proposes these relationships based on the tenets of the attention based view of 
the firm. 
 Research in the cooperation literature has studied both volume and variety to better 
understand the nature of the relationship between cooperation and performance.  For example, 
Deeds and Hill (1996) examine the number of alliances a firm manages and report a curvilinear 
relationship between number of relationships and new product development in a high tech sector.  
Other studies have also examined the extent to which number of cooperative engagements 
influence firm performance; however, most of this research has been in limited contexts with 
unique measures of performance like new product development, patents, or other measures of 
firm innovation outputs (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).  Researchers have also taken a 
configurational approach to understand how a certain mix of cooperative engagements may help 
or hinder a firm’s performance (Ahuja, 2000; Hoffmann, 2007).  While these studies provide 
strong insights into the performance implications of cooperation, they fall outside the scope of 
the current study.  By taking an attention based view approach to understanding how cooperative 
diversity influences performance, the focus is more on the internal limitations rather than how a 
firm positions itself relative to peers to gain an advantageous position.  This study proposes that 
in situations characterized by highly diverse cooperative engagements, the deteriorating effects 
of alliance portfolio size will be magnified.  In essence, when a firm is faced with a large number 
of diverse cooperative engagements, the firm will struggle to manage and capitalize on the value 
associated with the cooperative engagements of the firm.  Firms that actively engage relevant 
cooperative partners, and do not overextend themselves into unrelated cooperative engagements 
will likely have higher levels of performance due to the value relationships with market-specific 
and market-related partners provide the firm (Jiang et al., 2010).  Stated formally: 
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Hypothesis 4a:  The cooperation-performance relationship will be moderated by the 
diversity of cooperative actions, such that the relationship will deteriorate with fewer 
cooperative actions when the actions are diverse. 
 
Likewise, within the competition literature, researchers have identified volume and 
variety as important factors in the relationship between behaviors and performance.  
Traditionally, this literature focuses attention on the dynamic nature of competition from an 
economic perspective (D'Aveni, Dagnino, & Smith, 2010).  For instance, structural determinants 
such as industry, market similarity, among a variety of other external factors have been identified 
as predictors of competitive behaviors (Chi, Ravichandran, & Andrevski, 2010; Markman, 
Gianiodis, & Buchholtz, 2009).  A relatively newer stream of research focuses attention on 
understanding the cognitive motivations for behavior, and how cognition effects a firm’s ability 
to effectively manage and leverage competitive behaviors (Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Marcel, 
Barr, & Duhaime, 2011).  This growing area of inquiry seeks to shed light on how competitive 
moves are determined by features and factors within the firm.  Extending this internal 
perspective beyond possessing and managing resources, this study contributes by proposing 
where a firm focuses attention as a core determinant of a firm’s ability to capture value from 
competitive activity.  This study not only examines the volume of competitive actions, but also 
tests the interactive effects of diversity of competitive actions on the curvilinear relationship 
between competitive action and firm performance.  At low levels of diversity, firms continue 
applying and leveraging the competitive actions that have been commonly leveraged in the past.  
At high levels of diversity, firms may struggle to effectively leverage the competitive actions.  
This may be a result of misappropriated heuristics and lack of attention to routinized behaviors 
without devoting necessary attention to determine the most effective and appropriate types of 
actions to enact (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999).  In other words, the attention-based view 
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suggests that firms with highly diverse competitive repertoires may not be able to devote the 
necessary attention to these behaviors to effectively manage and leverage the competitive 
behaviors.  As such, it is proposed that the original relationship will be magnified at high levels 
of competitive behavior diversity.  Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 4b:  The competition-performance relationship will be moderated by the 
diversity of competitive actions, such that the relationship will deteriorate with fewer 
competitive actions when the actions are diverse. 
 
Finally, the model also proposes a relationship between the balance of competitive and 
cooperative behaviors and subsequent firm performance.  A key distinction that separates the 
final hypothesis from the previous discussion is the concept of balance.  While the previous 
hypotheses focus attention on understanding how the independent level of competition and 
cooperation influence performance, little research has examined the effect the balance of these 
two behaviors has on the firm’s performance.  In considering cooperative and competitive 
actions in tandem, this study draws from the ambidexterity literature (March, 1991). 
Research examining organizational ambidexterity provides a view of how potentially 
paradoxical behaviors within the firm can be managed and leveraged appropriately to maximize 
performance outcomes.  Literature examining organizational ambidexterity suggests that 
opposing types of behavior provides unique benefits to the organization; however, an 
overreliance on one or the other is often detrimental to the organization due to the sacrifice of the 
benefits associated with the other (Chen, 2008).  Within the existing ambidexterity literature, 
research supports the notion that, while these behaviors may seem paradoxical, they both 
represent necessary actions for the firm to improve performance and gain a competitive 
advantage (Raisch et al., 2009).  In cooperation research, the logic of balance has been applied to 
corporate expansions.  Prior research has shown that a balance between greenfield activity and 
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acquisitions leads to longer term success rather than reliance on one type of activity over the 
other (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001).  Prior research in the ambidexterity literature has begun to 
shed light onto the appropriate balance for competing organizational actions, although the debate 
continues regarding what constitutes balance (Gupta et al., 2006; March, 1991; Raisch & 
Birkinshaw, 2008). 
In a similar vein to the classic organizational ambidexterity notion of balance between 
opposing forces, it is expected that competition and cooperation require balance between the two 
sets of actions to positively influence performance (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Ketchen et al., 
2004).  At the extreme, intense, cut-throat competition within an industry can le ad to rapidly 
deteriorating profitability in an industry (Porter, 1980).  An overreliance on cooperation may also 
lead to deteriorating performance (Park et al., 2013).  An organization must find and manage an 
appropriate balance of these two seemingly competing interests to maximize firm performance 
over time (Raisch et al., 2009). 
In the context of the present study, it is proposed that a balance between competition and 
cooperation is necessary to maximize firm performance.  Competition and cooperation represent 
an inherent tradeoff in order to increase one or the other.  For example, organizations often 
engage in cooperation to acquire or develop new resources and engage in competitive behaviors 
to capitalize and reap the benefits of the resources of the firm (Bengtsson, Eriksson, & Wincent, 
2010; Tsai, 2002).  As a means of understanding how competition and cooperation integratively 
impact firm performance, this study predicts that organizations with moderate levels of 
competition and cooperation, relative to peers, will have higher levels of firm performance.  
Firms that are able to maintain a balance of moderate levels of competition and cooperation will 
be able to reap the benefits of both competitive and cooperative actions without overemphasizing 
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one or the other.  This approach emphasizes the interdependent nature of competitive and 
cooperative actions and suggests a need for both types of actions, but also predicts that an 
imbalance of these actions will negatively impact performance.  Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 5:  Industry adjusted balance of moderate competition and cooperation will 
have a curvilinear relationship with firm performance, such that cooperation or 
competition dominated firms will have lower levels of performance. 
 
Conclusion 
 To summarize, the purpose of the proposed research model seeks to understand the 
antecedents and outcomes associated with competitive actions by leveraging the attention based 
view of the firm and insights from the ambidexterity literature.  The model suggests that 
attention to competition and cooperation is manifested in competitive and cooperative actions, 
and the firm’s ability to focus attention on these actions will determine the extent to which the 
organization effectively captures the value from these actions.  By examining direct, indirect, and 
curvilinear relationships, the complexity of the model extends knowledge of both the theories 
and the phenomena being addressed. 
 The previous sections provided the overview of the proposed study, a review of the 
relevant literatures, and connect theory to the hypotheses within the research model.  Having 
developed the rationale for the research model and overviewing how this research will fit and 
contribute within the existing research, the following section discusses the empirical framework 
being leveraged to analyze the research questions of interest.  In later sections, the research 
outcomes are reported and contributions to the literature will be reviewed along with limitations 




CHAPTER 4:  METHODOLOGY 
 
 This chapter provides a detailed description and overview of the measurement and 
analytical tools used to empirically test the research model hypothesized in the dissertation.  
First, a broad overview of the data, measurements, and tools is presented.  Second, a detailed 
explanation of the process behind developing and applying content analysis is provided.  Third, a 
detailed description of the variable measurements is provided.  Fourth, a description of the 
analytical tests is provided to overview the statistical analyses applied to test the research model.  
Finally, the results are reported followed by post hoc analyses and robustness tests of the 
research findings. 
Overview 
In order to test the proposed model, this study uses a longitudinal quantitative approach; 
this approach has been leveraged and validated by others in related streams of research (Chen & 
Hambrick, 1995; Furrer, Thomas, & Goussevskaia, 2008; Gnyawali & He, 2006).  To capture the 
necessary elements associated with the model, it is necessary that the sample be drawn from a 
context in which competition and cooperation are likely to occur.  As such, the sample is drawn 
from two industries—the medical devices manufacturing industry (3841) and the oil and gas 
field services industry (1381, 1389)—and focuses solely on publicly traded companies.  
Measurement of the variables leverages existing metrics for established measures or, for new 
variables, follows existing processes of construct development.  Attention measures are drawn 
from a unique dictionary that was developed, validated, and applied to annual reports (Marcel et 
al., 2011), competitive and cooperative actions are measured through news reports (Andrevski, 
Brass, & Ferrier, 2013; Rindova et al., 2010), and performance and control variables are drawn 
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from Compustat.  Finally, the model is analyzed using a two-stage OLS regression model to 
assess the hypothesized relationships. 
Content Analysis 
Content analysis has a strong history of application in the social sciences, and also within 
the field of strategic management (Jauch, Osborn, & Martin, 1980; Shapiro & Markoff, 1997).  
Content analysis has been applied to data of many forms such as interview transcripts, speeches, 
letters to shareholders, newspaper articles, and a variety of other mediums from which words, 
themes, and accounts of actions or behaviors can be drawn (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007).  
This data collection tool is often used when collecting, coding, and analyzing secondary data 
both from and about a focal subject, or in this case a focal firm.  When applied to text analysis, 
content analysis provides researchers with an opportunity to assess both manifest and latent 
variables that are being explicitly or implicitly addressed in the text source (Bettman & Weitz, 
1983; Phillips, 1994; Short & Palmer, 2007).  For example, text analysis has been applied in the 
strategic management field to assess the extent to which firms focus attention on different 
technologies, and has also been applied to phenomena such as competitive behaviors and actions 
(Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Ferrier et al., 1999).  With a well-established history within strategic 
management research, content analysis appears to be an appropriate and robust tool for assessing 
the constructs and relationships proposed in the research model. 
When applying content analysis, it is necessary to identify the unit of analysis associated 
with the phenomena of interest.  In this case, the proposed study seeks to identify and analyze (1) 
attention to competition and cooperation, and (2) the manifestation of this attention in the form 
of competitive and cooperative actions.  When assessing the attention to competition and 
cooperation, the focus is on understanding the implicit attention to competitive and cooperative 
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elements.  In the present context, it is necessary to develop a dictionary through inductive coding 
of documents, and then apply this dictionary to further documents.  This approach to dictionary 
development and application is common when being applied to new contexts that have yet to be 
studied in prior research (Sonpar & Golden-Biddle, 2008).  New dictionaries are needed to fit the 
idiosyncratic contexts in which the phenomena are studied, given the analysis focuses on 
organizational level measures rather than measures at the individual level.  Second, while the 
attention measures focus on identifying implicit attention to competition and cooperation, the 
content analysis of secondary sources associated with competitive behaviors is drawn from 
explicit, identifiable behaviors.  This type of content analysis of competitive behaviors is 
commonly used in the strategic management literature, and will not require development of a 
unique dictionary (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004). 
By integrating existing measures of established constructs with the development of 
dictionaries for new phenomena, this study leverages previous measurements while also 
extending the application of content analysis to new areas of inquiry.  Using content analysis as a 
driving methodology provides rich insights into the attention and behaviors of organizations that 
would be difficult to directly ascertain with other methods.  By measuring attention and action 
through reports of enacted behaviors and the direction of organizational attention and resources, 
content analysis mitigates the potential biases associated with survey research and interviews.  
As such, it is uniquely applicable to the proposed model that seeks to assess both implicit and 
explicit constructs of interest.  Having provided a brief overview of content analysis, the 
following discussion will elaborate on the sample, measures, and proposed analytical framework 





In order to assess the research model, it is important that the sample be drawn from a 
context in which competition and cooperation are both present and identifiable behaviors.  Also, 
considering the measures and nature of content analysis, it is important that the firms within the 
sample have the requisite text-based data available.  Because publicly traded firms have stronger 
reporting requirements (e.g., letters to shareholders, annual reports, performance metrics), and 
generate more news volume than non-public firms, publicly traded firms were the focus of this 
study.  Reports are common sources of data for strategic management researchers leveraging 
content analysis methods (Short & Palmer, 2007).  Taking these factors into consideration, this 
study includes two samples:  (1) 15 medical device manufacturing firms and (2) 15 oil and gas 
field services firms.  These industries were selected based on the prevalence of publicly traded 
companies, and the relatively high levels of competition and cooperation within the industries.  
Both samples are stratified across the same 10 year window (2002-2013 with one year lags 
between predictor and outcome variables).  Combined, these two samples provide a total sample 
size of 300 firm-year observations. 
Measures 
 In this section, I describe the process of developing and applying the measures of the 
focal study.  With content analysis, it is common to use existing measures and dictionaries; 
however, it is also common to develop dictionaries to assess a specific phenomenon of interest 
(Smith et al., 2001).  Considering that measures of attention have yet to be developed but other 
measures have been developed in prior research, this study applies both existing and developed 




Table 4.1:  Summary of Measures 
Measures Previous Literature 
Attention to Competition:  developed/used dictionary 
that references competitive elements within the annual 
report.  References to relative positioning, competitive 
elements, industries, etc. coded as attention to competition 
Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan, 
2008; Kabanoff & Brown, 2008 
  
Attention to Cooperation:  Developed/used dictionary 
that references cooperative engagements and cooperative 
language in the annual report 
Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan, 
2008; Kabanoff & Brown, 2008 
  
Competitive Actions:  Adapted from Ferrier’s dictionary 
that identified competitive behaviors via content analysis 
of news articles/headlines (7 categories:  pricing, 
marketing, new product, capacity, legal, signaling, 
executive change) 
Ferrier, 1999; Ferrier, 2001 
  
Cooperative Actions:  Measure of cooperative 
relationships, with a 5-year duration, if not specified in the 
SDC data 
Lavie, 2007; Stuart, 2000 
  
Balance of Competition and Cooperation:  Calculated 
as the ratio of competitive to cooperative behaviors.  Z-
scores calculated to develop measures for balance relative 
to peer firms 
Not yet studied in this context 
  
Action Type/Diversity:  Herfindahl and Blau indices 
calculated as a measure of action diversity.  These are 
common measures of diversity within competition and 
cooperation research, and strategic management, at large.  
For cooperation, industry diversity is measured by SIC 
code similarity 
Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm 1999; 
Ferrier, 2001; Jiang, Tao, & 
Santoro, 2010 
  
Firm Performance:  ROI, ROE, ROA, ROS, market 
share growth, and sales growth collected via Compustat 
database 
Andrevski, Brass, & Ferrier, 
2013; Ferrier, 2001; Ndofor, 
Sirmon, & He, 2011 
  
Controls:  firm size, TMT diversity, slack resources, 
performance variation collected via Compustat database 
Andrevski, Brass, & Ferrier, 
2013; Rindova, Ferrier,  
& Wiltbank, 2010; Jiang, Tao, & 






 According to research in both the competitive and cooperative domains, the prime 
objective of both competitive and cooperative behaviors is to achieve a competitive advantage or 
improve firm performance (Nag et al., 2007).  Independently, competition and cooperation 
researchers have suggested positive effects of competitive and cooperative actions in relation to 
firm performance (Chen & Miller, 2012; Wassmer, 2010).  More recently, coopetition research 
that integrates both competition and cooperation has suggested that elements of both competition 
and cooperation may have a synergistic relationship and lead to higher levels of firm 
performance (Park et al., 2013). 
Considering the common empirical examination of firm performance as a dependent 
variable of interest, a variety of metrics have been applied to accurately measure the performance 
implications of firm behaviors (Combs, Crook, & Shook, 2005).  While there is diversity 
associated with the measures of firm performance, a common thread that runs through many 
studies is the application of financial metrics such as return on assets, return on sales, return on 
equity, sales growth, and market share growth (Richard, Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 2009).  In 
line with previous research, ROA and ROS are the performance measurements assessed in the 
formal hypothesis testing (Derfus et al., 2008; Young, Smith, & Grimm, 1996).  Further 
measurements are explored and assessed in the post hoc analysis as a robustness test. 
Independent Variables 
Attention Measures 
For the measurement of attention, I developed a new dictionary by pairing existing 
qualitative research with a preliminary frequency analysis of keywords in the annual reports of 
organizations within the sample (Short, Broberg, Cogliser, & Brigham, 2009).  Due to the lack of 
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an existing measure to assess the focus of organizational attention on competitive and 
cooperative factors, the research project necessitated a rigorous approach to dictionary 
development and validation (Short et al., 2009).  By developing and applying a dictionary of 
attention to competition and cooperation in the annual report, this research is one of the early 
studies to operationalize and measure attention at the firm level.  Whereas much extant research 
uses CEO letters to shareholders as measures of attention, measuring attention at the same level 
might suggest a stronger and more accurate depiction of the relationship between attention and 
action than was previously identified (Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994). 
 For the development of the attention to competition and cooperation dictionary, keywords 
were initially drawn from prior research.  These keywords were developed based on existing 
measurements of competitive and cooperative actions alongside existing measures of attention in 
letters to shareholders (Ferrier et al., 1999; Marcel et al., 2011).  These keywords were the 
foundation for measurements that were applied and coded into the dictionary.  For example, 
references to ‘innovation’ or ‘research and development’ were coded as attention to product 
competition.  Second, a frequency analysis was conducted on twenty percent of the sample to 
identify alternative keywords that would be indicative of attention to competition or cooperation 
(Neuendorf, 2002).  Whereas the foundational dictionary identified and assessed attention 
separate from the competitive and cooperative actions, this coding process provides a holistic 
assessment that ties the phenomena of interest (competition and cooperation) to the context of 
the sample (annual reports).  This measurement of attention and action at the same firm level 
allows for linear and curvilinear statistical analysis without the confounding effects associated 
with regression tests when measuring variables at different levels. 
57 
 
 After independently developing the dictionary from the existing literature and frequency 
analysis, the dictionary was sent to experts in the field with experience in similar research.  
Specifically, authors of the foundational work in developing competitive action measurements 
and early researchers in the field of assessing attention using qualitative measurement were 
contacted.  This stage further validates the dictionary by having experts provide their feedback 
on which dictionary keywords are likely to be true assessments and measures of the phenomena 
of interest (Short et al., 2009).  Upon receiving feedback from the expert reviewers, the 
dictionary was edited to add and remove keywords identified by the experts based on how well 
the dictionary truly measures the constructs of interest. 
The dictionary was then sent to three peers for an assessment of interrater reliability.  
These peers have knowledge of the existing research project, but were only provided with a 
blank dictionary and asked to code specific keywords into the provided categories of interest 
within the domains of competition and cooperation.  This is the suggested approach laid out by 
Krippendorff (2012).  The interrater reliability for the attention dictionaries was .79.  
Traditionally, researchers suggest .80 is indicative of agreement for existing dictionaries and .70 
is indicative of agreement when assessing constructs that are more exploratory in nature—such 
as new dictionary development contexts (Krippendorff, 2008).  This level of agreement falls 
within the threshold of existing research to indicate agreement among coders, especially in the 
context of developing a new dictionary.  All coding discrepancies were discussed and resolved, 
resulting in a finalized dictionary for attention to competition and cooperation dictionary that is 




Table 4.2:  Attention to Competition and Cooperation 
Category Subcategory Keywords Example in Context 
Competition Pricing Deductive—Discount, Price (and variants), Rate, Rebate 
Inductive—None added 
Competitors may develop superior products of similar 
quality at the same or lower prices. 
    
 Marketing Deductive—Advertisement, Ads, Marketing, Promote, Campaign 
Inductive—Advertis*, Promot* 
To maintain or increase revenues from sales of our 
current products, we may be required to adopt new 
sales and marketing strategies 
    
 Product Deductive—Innovate, Introduce, Launch, Product, Product 
Development, Research and Development, Unveil, Roll out 
Inductive—Design, Develop, Exploration, Exploratory, Patents, 
Quality, Research, Services, Technology 
Our increase in product development costs reflect our 
efforts to expand and enhance our product lines 
    
 Capacity Deductive—Capacity, Efficiency, Expansion, Increase output, 
Growing 
Inductive—Consolidate, Distribution, Equipment, Expanding, 
Manufacturing, Production, Restructur*, Volume 
Our SAP implementation in July 2006 resulted in 
improved efficiencies that lowered COGS 
    
 Legal Deductive—Court, Infringement, Settle, Sue, Litigate 
Inductive—Appeal, Audit, Legal, Litigation  
We instituted a legal action in Federal Court to 
determine the arbitrability of the claims asserted 
    
 Signaling Deductive—Aim, Future, Goal, Objective, Vow, Promise 
Inductive—Award*, Brand, Change, Commitment 
We are also conducting clinical trials…with the goal of 
establishing Impella as the standard of care 
    
 Positioning Deductive—Best, First, Industry, Lead, Leader, Relative, 
Position, Top 
Inductive—Advantage, Compet*, Gain, Increase, Largest, 
Maintain, Market, Peer, Position*, Second, Segment, Standard, 
Superior 
Our business position depends on our ability to 
maintain and defend our existing patents 
    
Cooperation Keywords Alliance, Contract, Cooperation, Cooperat*, Joint, Joint Venture, 
Partner*, Supplier, Relationship 
Bard markets its products through 20 subsidiaries and 
a joint venture in over 90 countries outside the US 
    
 Inductive 
Keywords 
Agreement, Association, Conjunction, Distributors, 
Intercompany, Partnership, Team, United, Vendors, Negotiate, 
Collaboration 
We rely on distributors to market and sell our products 
in parts of Europe, Asia, South America, and Australia 
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Action Measures  
While the dictionary applied to the attention measures required extensive development 
and firsthand validation, the dictionary and measures associated with competitive and 
cooperative actions was applied based on previously validated and applied metrics.  Competitive 
dynamics research has shifted from a general analysis of organizational characteristics to the 
measurement and analysis of tacit competitive actions as the focal unit of analysis.  Derived from 
work by Ferrier and colleagues (1999), the competition dictionary consisted of six categories for 
competitive actions.  One additional category was added for executive change due to the existing 
research that suggests organizational attention is manifested in the members of the top 
management team (Cho & Hambrick, 2006), and changes on this top management team 
represent a shift in the phenomena that are being addressed by the organization. 
Consistent with the prevailing norms in competitive dynamics research, competitive 
action data is collected using the Lexis-Nexis database (Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010; 
Derfus et al., 2008; Ndofor et al., 2011).  This database includes headlines from the top global, 
national, and regional outlets as well as trade journals that identify and report on industry-
specific firm actions.  These actions and the categories are listed in Table 4.3.  While this 
dictionary was previously validated, interrater reliability on coding was also assessed for the 
coding of these actions to ensure coding was consistent with the existing literature and between 
coders.  The interrater reliability for the actions was found to have a Krippendorff’s alpha of .85 
among three peers.  Discrepancies and issues were again resolved to indicate a strong agreement 




Table 4.3:  Competition Measures 
Variable Measure Example in Context 
Pricing Action Count of headlines referencing: price, rate, discount, 
rebate, or related material 
Patterson-UTI Pumps Big Profit; 
Contract Oil Driller Has Jacked Up Its 
Day Rates 
   
Marketing Action Count of headlines referencing: ads, spot, promote, 
distribute, campaign, or related material 
BD Highlights Social Responsibility in 
First Global Corporate Citizenship 
Report 
   
Product Action Count of headlines referencing: introduce, launch, 
unveil, roll out, or related material 
ABIOMED Announces New Patent for 
Heart Wrap Technology 
   
Capacity Action Count of headlines referencing: raises, boosts, increases, 
or related material 
Cardinal Health Doubles West Coast 
Sterile Manufacturing Capacity to 
Support Growing Biotech Industry 
   
Legal Action Count of headlines referencing: sues, litigate, court, 
settles, infringement, or related material 
Helmerich and Payne agrees to pay $1 
million penalty to resolve allegations of 
foreign bribery in South America 
   
Signaling Action Count of headlines referencing: vows, promises, says, 
seeks, aims, or related material 
Haemonetics Reaffirms Fiscal 2006 View 
   
Executive Change Action Count of headlines referencing change in top 
management team or board of directors, or related 
material 
GB announces departure of directors, 
certain officers, election of directors, 
appointment of certain officers, 




 Cooperative actions were assessed based on prevailing measures in the existing literature, 
while also being supplemented by further identification of cooperation by examining news 
reports of cooperation that are not necessarily identified in formal joint ventures and alliances.  
SDC Platinum database captures formal and official cooperative agreements between firms, 
specifically joint ventures and alliances (Lavie, 2007; Stuart, 2000).  While this captures some of 
the firm’s cooperative activity, it fails to capture a holistic measure of a firm’s portfolio of 
formal and informal cooperation (Wassmer, 2010).  As such, news reports were also analyzed to 
supplement the SDC data; these reports are coded as cooperation if they referenced cooperative 
activity between a focal firm and another organization or group of organizations.  For example, 
references to a distribution agreement between two firms is considered a form of cooperation.  
Partnerships on research and development projects are also coded as cooperation, among a 
variety of other situations where two or more organizations are working together.  By 
supplementing the SDC Platinum data with the hand coded headlines, a more holistic view of a 
firm’s cooperative activity portfolio emerges. 
Competitive and Cooperative Action Diversity 
Moderators of the relationships between competitive and cooperative actions were 
assessed using prevailing measures of diversity of competitive and cooperative action.  For 
diversity of competitive action, a Herfindahl index was applied to determine the extent to which 
an organization focuses on a single type of competitive action or multiple types of competitive 
actions (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004; Jiang et al., 2010).  A high Herfindahl index is indicative of a 
high level of diversity of competitive actions, whereas a low Herfindahl index suggests the firm 
relies on a smaller set of actions.  While the Herfindahl index is an appropriate measure of 
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diversity for continuous variables, when the variable being assessed is categorical the Blau index 
is a more appropriate measure of diversity (Blau, 1977). 
Following Jiang et al. (2010), cooperative agreements were assessed based on SIC code 
overlap at the four digit level.  Agreement at the four digit level was scored as 0 for no diversity, 
agreement at the three digit level was scored as 1 for partial diversity, agreement at the two digit 
level was scored as 2 for moderate diversity, agreement at the one digit level was coded as 3 for 
moderate diversity, and zero overlap of SIC code was coded as 4 for high diversity.  This coding 
of cooperative actions was then aggregated by year and a Blau index of heterogeneity was 
calculated to determine the diversity of cooperative engagements. 
Balance of Competition and Cooperation 
Finally, balance of competition and cooperation is assessed to determine the extent to 
which competition and cooperation are synergistically related.  Having calculated the total 
competitive and cooperative behaviors of the firms, a ratio of competitive to cooperative 
behaviors is calculated to determine the balance associated with competition and cooperation of 
the firm.  Due to the lack of cooperation from a number of firms, the ratio measure would be 
undefined.  As such, competition and cooperation were measured separately to assess similarity 
to the mean of the industry.  This was calculated by standardizing the scores of competition and 
cooperation and examining the absolute value of the difference score between the z-score and 
zero.  Firms with a small absolute value term are close to the mean, suggesting a balanced level 
of competition or cooperation.  To conduct linear analysis on these variables, the scores are 
transformed such that higher levels indicate more balanced levels of competition and 
cooperation.  Finally, to avoid the undefined scores and lack of interpretability associated with 
non-linear relationships, the two scores are then run in an interaction model to examine if high 
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levels of both competition balance and cooperation balance yield the highest levels of 
performance.  This allows for the assessment of (1) competition-dominated firms, (2) balanced 
firms, and (3) cooperation-dominated firms.  By developing and applying this metric of 
competition and cooperation balance, it provides an initial measure of a construct that has yet to 
be operationalized in previous research.  Further conditional analyses are conducted to examine 
the performance implications associated with balanced competition and cooperation at high, 
medium, and low levels of competition and cooperation. 
Control Variables 
 While some of the potential confounding factors are controlled by the dual industry 
sample, within industry factors will still need to be controlled for in the model (Deephouse, 
2000).  As a result of previously tested relationships and controls in related research, the research 
models control for firm specific factors that may influence the hypothesized relationships.  The 
control variables include firm size, slack resources, performance variation, and varying forms of 
top management (TMT) diversity.  These measures and the previous findings associated with 
these variables are described below. 
Available resources are suggested to influence the competitive and cooperative actions of 
a firm (Chen & Hambrick, 1995).  Two variables that are commonly measured as indicators of 
available resources are firm size and the availability of slack resources.  At the firm level, size is 
measured as the log of total assets, and slack resources is measured as cash-on-hand (Andrevski 
et al., 2013; George, 2005).  Also at the firm level, an organization’s consistency in performance 
may influence the competitive and cooperative actions a firm implements (Ndofor et al., 2011).  
Performance variation is measured as the standard deviation of ROA in the previous three years. 
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The characteristics and prior experiences of TMT members may have an impact on how 
well a firm manages diverse competitive and cooperative engagements (Cho, Hambrick, & Chen, 
1994).  As such, TMT diversity is measured as: firm tenure, industry experience, age, and 
functional background heterogeneity (Rindova et al., 2010).  TMT Firm tenure and TMT 
industry experience diversity measures are both calculated as a coefficient of variation (standard 
deviation divided by the mean) (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004).  Due to the categorical nature of 
educational and functional background, a Blau index was calculated to determine the diversity of 
education and functional domains of TMT members.  Finally, TMT Size is also measured and 
controlled due to the potential for larger TMTs to have more attention to devote to competition 
and cooperation. 
Preliminary Data Analysis 
 In order to analyze the data applying ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, certain 
assumptions are necessary to ensure valid inferences are drawn from the statistical tests (Cohen, 
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2013).  Before testing the specific research questions, the data was 
analyzed for missing data, multicollinearity, normal distribution of errors, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity (Lewis-Beck, 1980).  All of the data analysis was conducted in STATA and 
SPSS software packages. 
Missing Data 
 While the data is drawn from publicly traded companies that have requirements for 
reporting on the variables of interest for the specific study, there are still instances where data is 
either not available or not reported by the databases.  As such, it was necessary to resolve any 
missing data instances that would influence and adversely affect the analysis and results.  While 
there are numerous ways in which to resolve missing data, one of the strongest ways of resolving 
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missing data is to apply multiple imputation (Rubin, 1996).  This process averages the outcomes 
across multiple imputations of the data, and generates new values for missing scores within the 
data set.  Further, due to the panel nature of the data set it was necessary to conduct the multiple 
imputation process on each individual firm to ensure a valid within subject score is calculated 
and applied.  Within the overall sample, data were only missing in control variables or 
components of performance measures such as ROI and ROE:  cash, stockholder’s equity, and 
invested capital.  Within these variables, none had more than 5% missing on any individual 
variable, and as such, multiple imputation is an appropriate method of resolving missing data 
issues (Schafer, 1999).  Upon completing the multiple imputation process, I then tested for 
independence of the variables. 
Multicollinearity 
 Multicollinearity, or the high linear correlation of two predictor variables, represents a 
significant confounding effect in regression (Farrar & Glauber, 1967).  In order to test for the 
possibility of multicollinearity, I calculated and analyzed the variance inflation factors (VIFs) to 
further explore whether or not multicollinearity was present.  A general rule of thumb suggests 
that any of the independent variables with a VIF over 10 represents the presence of 
multicollinearity (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & William, 1998).  The average VIF among 
independent variables was 4.4, well below the threshold outlined in current research.  Also, 
curvilinear terms were not included in the test for multicollinearity due to the fact that the scores 
are calculated based on the linear independent variables. 
Normal Distribution of Errors 
 Another assumption and condition of OLS regression is the requirement that the errors 
associated with the fitted model are normally distributed.  Upon running the linear test between 
66 
 
the independent variables and the dependent variable, the error terms were identified and 
analyzed by creating a normality plot.  A linear term is generated, and the scores for the specific 
variables of interest are plotting along the line.  The results showed a strong fit between the 
actual data and the linear prediction, which strongly suggests that the error terms are normally 
distributed. 
Linearity 
 While the research model tests linear and curvilinear hypotheses, the linear relationships 
in the model were tested for the nature of the relationship independently of the quadratic terms.  
After running the linear relationships, a residual-versus-fitted (RVF) plot was generated and 
analyzed that assess the relationship between the residual error terms and the fitted prediction 
terms of the model.  The plot showed no signs of non-linear relationships and suggested that the 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable is indeed linear 
(Cohen et al., 2013). 
Homoscedasticity 
 In order to test for homoscedasticity, it is necessary to examine the distribution of 
variance across the range of values of the independent variable.  Similar to the above tests, the 
linear regression model was calculated and postestimation tests provided the statistical 
assessment of the homoscedasticity of the data.  For each regression model, a Cook-Weisberg 
test for heteroscedasticity was calculated, and each model met the assumption of 
homoscedasticity (Cohen et al., 2013).  Having found no significant results that reject the null 
hypothesis of normal variance across the range of values for the independent variable, the 
research models suggest that the distribution of variance across values of the models are 
homoscedastic.  Finally, to further control for potential confounding influence of 
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heteroscedasticity, the statistical analyses were run with robust standard errors to mitigate 
heteroscedasticity effects. 
Conclusion 
 Having thoroughly tested and ensured the assumptions associated with OLS regression 
have been met, the following analyses appear appropriate and valid for testing the hypothesized 
relationships.  By rigorously testing the data in pre- and post-estimation contexts, the OLS results 
associated with the regression tests are appropriate and accurate depictions of the relationships 
present in the dataset.  In the following section, I will describe the analysis framework and the 




CHAPTER 5:  ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 This section provides a thorough description of the analyses applied to test the 
hypothesized relationships.  First, it provides an overview and summary of the analysis 
framework for the study.  Second, the results associated with the specific hypothesis testing 
proposed in the research model are discussed.  Third, a summary of the research findings 
followed by a discussion of the limitations is presented.  Finally, it concludes with a thorough 
explanation of a variety of post hoc analyses that were tested to further explore the relationships 
among constructs in the research model. 
Analysis 
 Considering the structure of the research model and the panel nature of the data, OLS 
regression provides the strongest statistical test for the research model.  While the structural 
model appears to be appropriate for structural equation modeling (SEM), controlling for the 
within and between firm-year factors is not as robust as when tested with OLS regression 
(Wooldridge, 2010).  Further, OLS regression allows for controlling firm specific factors as well 
as year specific factors that may confound the results.  Finally, the model being tested implies an 
inherent two stage method of analysis—the first stage of analysis assesses the relationships 
between attention to competition and cooperation and the enactment of competitive and 
cooperative actions, while the second stage of analysis assesses the relationships between 
competitive and cooperative actions and subsequent firm performance. 
 Another note about the panel nature of the data and subsequent analysis is how the time is 
controlled for and analyzed in the statistical tests.  Having drawn the sample from 30 firms 
across 10 years, the initial sample yielded a staggered sample of 300 firm-year observations.  It is 
staggered such that the lagging of variables matches up based on the hypothesized relationships.  
69 
 
For example, the attention variables were collected from 2002-2011, the action variables were 
collected from 2003-2012, and the performance measurements were collected from 2004-2013.  
This allows for the analysis to be conducted on the full 300 firm-year observations with the 
hypothesized lag of time to (1) allow for the attention to be directed towards the actions, and (2) 
for the performance of the organization to be influenced by the enacted competitive and 
cooperative actions. 
 Finally, in regards to time, the analysis is not conducted applying time-series regression 
due to the fact that the variables of interest are not inherently time-oriented.  In other words, time 
is not the predictor of the changes of the dependent variable, but rather the changes and variation 
of the independent variables are what determine the variation of the dependent variable.  The 
only time effects of interest, in the present study, are in reference to the independent variables 
having delayed effects on the dependent variable.  While time is not the focus of the study, year 
effects are controlled for to mitigate the effects associated with a specific year on the sample.  
Firm effects are also controlled for to minimize the potentially confounding effects of factors 
within the organization’s scope. 
Regression Results 
 Considering the two-stage nature of the research model, the results will be discussed in 
two sections.  The first model will be discussed referencing the relationships between the 
attention devoted to competition and cooperation and the enactment of competitive and 
cooperative actions.  The second model will then be discussed that addresses the relationships 
between the enactment of competitive and cooperative actions and the subsequent influence on 
firm performance.  A further, in-depth discussion of the results will follow in the Discussion.  A 
general overview of the descriptive statistics and correlations is provided in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1:  Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 


























ROA .06 .098 1            
ROS -1.27 16.40 0.12 1          
Comp 
Act 28.82 30.83 0.1 0.01 1         
Coop 
Act 2.62 3.91 0.21 0.02 0.5 1        
Comp 
Div .31 .19 0.12 0 0.26 0.05 1  
 
    
Coop 
Div .18 .25 0.12 -0.08 0.52 0.68 0.07 1       
Comp 
Att .04 .01 0.01 0.08 0.21 0.32 -0.17 0.34 1      
Coop 
Att .01 .01 -0.11 -0.31 -0.05 -0.07 -0.11 -0.04 -0.02 1        
Size 
(log) 7.04 1.93 0.24 -0.03 0.43 0.37 -0.17 0.32 0.18 0.15 1      
Slack 356.54 604.87 0.14 0.01 0.47 0.46 -0.21 0.45 0.13 0.14 0.63 1      
Perf 
Var .05 .08 -0.37 0.01 -0.09 -0.07 0.03 -0.08 -0.08 0.03 -0.33 -0.13 1     
TMT 
Func .70 .09 -0.03 0.23 -0.01 0.01 -0.1 0 0.27 0.08 0.05 -0.15 -0.02 1    
TMT 
Age .12 .12 -0.14 0.15 -0.21 -0.23 0.23 -0.24 0 -0.04 -0.38 -0.3 0.14 0.07 1   
TMT 
Tenure .69 .36 -0.32 0.05 -0.09 -0.1 -0.1 -0.07 0.03 0.1 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.08 1  
TMT 
Size 5.21 1.15 -0.02 0.16 0.14 0.13 -0.22 0.14 0.23 0.13 0.24 0.14 -0.1 0.45 -0.07 0.33 1 
Note: n=286, correlations above .12 are significant at the p<.05 level, correlations above .16 are significant at the p<.01 level.  Firm, Year, and Industry effects 
are controlled, but not reported due to length. 
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Attention to Action 
 When assessing the extent to which organizational attention influences competitive and 
cooperative action external factors must also be included in the model because they can influence 
the nature of the relationships being tested.  Considering the relatively new nature of examining 
the relationship between attention and action at the organizational level, the controls applied to 
the current model were drawn from the limited amount of existing empirical work regarding the 
topic.  The presence of previously tested variables within the model, the theoretically defined 
lagged effects of the independent variables, and the controls for industry, firm, and year effects 
suggest a robust model of analysis. 
Table 5.2:  Competitive and Cooperative Attention leading to Subsequent 
Competitive Actions 
 




Competitive Attention  2.83 
Cooperative Attention  -3.01 
   
Controls:   
Size 1.18 3.75 
Slack 15.05** 15.60** 
Performance Variation .98 1.22 
TMT Function -5.60** -6.69** 
TMT Age 2.85† 3.01† 
TMT Tenure .68 .68 
TMT Size -1.42 -.70 
   
R2 .69** .70** 
F-Statistic  F=1.61 
Notes: n=286.  Reported betas are standardized.   ** significance at the .01 level;     
* significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level.  Firm, Year, and 
Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length. 
 
 
 Tables 5.2 and 5.3 report the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2.  In Hypotheses 1a, a positive 
relationship is predicted between prior competitive attention and current competitive action.  
This hypothesis was not supported (β=2.83, p=.21).  Similarly, Hypothesis 1b predicted a 
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positive relationship between prior cooperative attention and current cooperative action.  This 
hypothesis was strongly supported (β=.63, p<.01).  In Hypothesis 2a, a negative relationship 
between prior competitive attention and current cooperative action was proposed based on the 
situated nature of attention within the organization.  This hypothesis was not supported.  Finally, 
Hypothesis 2b proposed a negative relationship between prior cooperative attention and current 
competitive action.  While the relationship was in the direction hypothesized (β=-3.01, p=.15), 
the effect is not significant failing to support Hypothesis 2b. 
Table 5.3:  Competitive and Cooperative Attention leading to 
Subsequent Cooperative Actions 
 










   
Controls:   
Size -.1.87** -2.24** 




TMT Function .71** .57** 
TMT Age -.32† -.25 
TMT Tenure .00 .04 
TMT Size -.45* -.41* 
   
R2 .81** .83** 
F-Statistic  F=9.38** 
 
Notes:  n=286.  Reported betas are standardized.  ** significance at the .01 
level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level.  Firm, 
Year, and Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length. 
 
 
Action to Performance 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict that the relationships between prior competition (3a) and 
cooperation (3b) and current firm performance are positive, but experience diminishing returns at 
higher levels of activity.  In testing Hypothesis 3a which suggests this deteriorating effect of 
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competitive action on firm performance is not supported in relationship to ROA or ROS.  In fact, 
the relationship between competitive activity and firm performance is found to have a significant 
curvilinear relationship between competitive action and ROS in the opposite direction than 
hypothesized, as indicated by the significant negative linear relationship (β=-15, p<.05) and 
positive quadratic term (β=.17, p<.05).  This relationship is shown in Figure 5.1.  Hypothesis 3b 
predicts the same diminishing returns relationship between cooperative actions and firm 
performance.  This relationship is supported in relation to ROA, with a positive linear 
relationship (β=.07, p<.01) and negative quadratic term (β=-.04, p<.05); however, the 
relationship is not supported in relation to ROS.  This significant curvilinear effect is shown in 
Figure 5.2.  These results are reported below in Tables 5.4 (ROA dependent variable) and 5.5 
(ROS dependent variable). 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b propose moderation of the curvilinear relationships between prior 
competitive and cooperative actions and current firm performance.  These hypotheses suggest 
that as the diversity of competitive and cooperative action increases, the diminishing returns will 
occur at lower levels of competitive and cooperative actions—magnifying the deteriorating 
effects on firm performance.  Hypothesis 4a, referencing the diversity of cooperative actions, is 
supported in Model 5 with a significant interaction term for the linear (β=-.04, p<.05) and 
curvilinear effects (β=.04, p<.05).  As seen in the interaction plot, higher cooperative diversity is 
better in low cooperative activity; however, at high levels of cooperative activity, the low 
cooperative diversity has higher levels of performance.  This significant interaction can be seen 
in Figure 5.3.  From Hypothesis 4b, the moderation of the existing curvilinear relationship 




Balance of Competitive and Cooperative Action in Relation to Performance 
 The final hypothesis proposes that a balance of competitive and cooperative actions, 
relative to peers, will lead to higher levels of firm performance.  For example, organizations that 
do not have too few or too many actions will have an optimal level of actions to yield higher 
performance.  The results of the balance model are shown in Table 5.6 below.  Model 2 tests the 
direct effects of competitive and cooperative balance independently, and Model 3 tests the 
interaction of competition and cooperation.  Based on the lack of significance for the direct or 
interaction terms, Hypothesis 5 is not supported in the model.  This relationship is further 
explored in the post hoc analyses to follow. 
Conclusion 
 The research model proposed testing a variety of direct, indirect, and non-linear 
relationships that have yet to be fully explored in the extant research.  In terms of support, only 
three of the nine hypotheses are supported.  Within the attention model, the only statistically 
significant relationship identified is the positive relationship between attention to cooperation 
and cooperative action.  Within the action to performance model, the relationship between 
cooperative action and firm performance was significant and curvilinear in the direction 
hypothesized.  In contrast, the curvilinear relationship between competitive action and firm 
performance was actually found to be significant in the opposite direction of the hypothesis.  The 
moderating effect of cooperative diversity on the relationship between cooperative actions and 
performance is also significant.  Several relationships are further explored in the following post 
hoc analyses.   
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Table 5.4:  Competitive and Cooperative Action to Subsequent Performance (ROA) 
 Model 1 (Controls) 
Model 2 (Direct Linear 
Effects) 
Model 3 (Direct Linear 
and Curvilinear) 
Model 4 (Linear, 
Curvilinear, Moderators) 




Independent Variables:      
Competitive Action  .00 -.01 -.01 -.01 
Competitive Action 
Squared 
  .00 .00 .00 
Cooperative Action  .02** .07** .07** .07** 
Cooperative Action 
Squared 
  -.04* -.04† -.05* 
      
Moderators:      
Competitive Diversity    .00 .00 
Cooperative Diversity    .00 .00 
      
Interactions:      
Competitive Action x 
Competitive Diversity 
    .00 
Competitive Action 
Squared x Competitive 
Diversity 
    .00 
Cooperative Action x 
Cooperative Diversity 
    -.04* 
Cooperative Action 
Squared x Cooperative 
Diversity 
    .04* 
      
Controls:      
Size -.04* -.03 -.03 -.03 -.03† 
Slack .02† .02* .02* .02* .02* 
Performance Variation -.03** -.02* -.02* -.02* -.03* 
TMT Function .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 
TMT Age .01 .01 .01† .01† .01† 
TMT Tenure -.01† -.01† -.01† -.01† -.01 
TMT Size .00 .01 .01 .01 .01 
      
R2 .59** .61** .62** .62** .63** 
F-Test  F=4.85** F=3.23* F=.36 F=2.56† 
Notes: n=278.  Reported betas are standardized.  ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level.  Firm, Year, and Industry 




Table 5.5:  Competitive and Cooperative Action to Subsequent Performance (ROS) 
 Model 1 (Controls) 
Model 2 (Direct Linear 
Effects) 
Model 3 (Direct 
Linear and 
Curvilinear) 
Model 4 (Linear, 
Curvilinear, 
Moderators) 




Independent Variables:      
Competitive Action  -.02 -.15* -.15* -.14* 
Competitive Action Squared   .17* .17* .14 
Cooperative Action  .01 .02 -.02 -.01 
Cooperative Action Squared   -.01 .02 -.01 
      
Moderators:      
Competitive Diversity    .00 -.01 
Cooperative Diversity    .02 .03 
      
Interactions:      
Competitive Action x 
Competitive Diversity 
    -.06 
Competitive Action Squared x 
Competitive Diversity 
    .11 
Cooperative Action x 
Cooperative Diversity 
    -.05 
Cooperative Action Squared x 
Cooperative Diversity 
    .06 
      
Controls:      
Size -.17** -.15* -.12† -.13† -.12† 
Slack .02 .01 .02 .02 .02 
Performance Variation -.04 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.05† 
TMT Function .00 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 
TMT Age .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
TMT Tenure .00 .00 -.01 .00 .00 
TMT Size .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
      
R2 .71** .71** .72** .72** .72** 
F-Stat for change in R2  F=.45 F=2.63† F=.76 F=.85 
Notes: n=276.  Reported betas are standardized.  ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level.  



















































Figure 5.1:  Competitive Action to ROS 



































Figure 5.3:  Cooperative Diversity Moderating 




Table 5.6:  Competitive and Cooperative Balance Interaction to Subsequent Performance (ROA) 
 Model 1 (Controls) 
Model 2 (Direct 
Linear Effects) 




   
Competitive Balance  .01 -.15 
Cooperative Balance  -.03 -.26 
    
Interaction:    
Competitive x Cooperative 
Balance 
  .25 
    
Controls:    
Size -.04** -.04* -.04* 
Slack .02* .02* .02** 
Performance Variation 
-.03*** -.02** -.02** 
TMT Function .00 .00 .00 
TMT Age .01 .01 .01 
TMT Tenure -.01* -.01* -.01* 
TMT Size .00 .01 .00 
    
R2 .59*** .59*** .60*** 
F-Test  F=.49 F=.97 
Notes: n=286.  Reported betas are standardized.  ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level;    
† significance at the .10 level.  Firm, Year, and Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length. 
 
Post Hoc Analyses 
 The proposed relationships and hypotheses in the research model focus on understanding 
(1) if attention to competition and cooperation influence the enactment of competitive and 
cooperative action and (2) if these competitive and cooperative actions shape performance.  
Inherent in the model and proposed analyses is a focus on time—for instance, when are the 
outcome variables influenced by the attention and actions of the independent variables?  As 
tested in the formal hypotheses, the effects are lagged one year to allow for the firm to 
implement the actions referenced in the annual reports (attention), and also to allow for the value 
to be captured and the market to react to the competitive and cooperative actions of the firm.  As 
tested, the varying effects on different performance variables provides potentially interesting 
implications for what actions influence different measures of firm performance.  Beyond ROA 
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and ROS which were used as performance measures for hypothesis testing, other measures of 
performance were analyzed to assess the impact of competitive and cooperative action.  Also, the 
results were tested in separate industry samples to assess the extent to which the results vary 
within the different industry contexts.  Finally, the hypothesis regarding balance of competitive 
and cooperative actions is further explored leveraging ANOVA to determine where group 
differences exist in regards to firm performance. 
 The longitudinal analysis of the panel data was conducted such that the reactions to the 
independent variables would be manifested in subsequent years.  For example, attention in prior 
years (t-1) would influence the current year’s actions (t), and current actions would not lead to 
higher levels of performance until the firm captures the value associated with the market’s 
reaction to the competitive and cooperative actions in subsequent years (t+1).  As a post hoc 
analysis, the same models tested in the formal hypotheses were examined as cross-sectional data 
without the lag of the independent variables.  This was conducted to assess the extent to which 
organizational attention and actions occur simultaneously, rather than with delayed effects that 
were tested in the lagged models. 
 For the attention leading to action, the analysis suggests that organizational attention 
influences actions in the present, as well.  As indicated in Tables 5.7 and 5.8, the relationship 
between competitive attention and competitive action becomes marginally significant (β=4.28, 
p<.10).  In addition, the magnitude of the relationship between cooperative attention and 
competitive action is negative (β=-2.14), but not significant.  Second, the positive relationship 
between cooperative attention and cooperative action remains significant when tested without 
lagged independent variables (β=.40, p<.05).  The effect of competitive attention on cooperative 




Table 5.7:  Competitive and Cooperative Attention leading to 
Competitive Actions 
 
 Model 3 (non-lagged IVs) Model 4 (non-lagged IVs) 
Independent Variables:   
Competitive Attention  4.28† 
Cooperative Attention  -2.14 
   
Controls:   
Size 1.18 .71 
Slack 15.05** 15.93** 
Performance Variation .98 1.18 
TMT Function -5.60** -6.08** 
TMT Age 2.85† 2.63 
TMT Tenure .68 .80 
TMT Size -1.42 -1.47 
   
R2 .69** .70** 
F-Statistic  F=3.56† 
Notes: n=286.  Reported betas are standardized 
** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the 
.10 level 




Table 5.8:  Competitive and Cooperative Attention leading to 
Cooperative Actions 
 




Competitive Attention  .10 
Cooperative Attention  .40* 
   
Controls:   
Size -.1.87** -1.95** 




TMT Function .71** .695** 
TMT Age -.32† -.24 
TMT Tenure .00 -.08 
TMT Size -.45* -.41* 
   
R2 .81** .82** 
F-Statistic  F=3.85* 
Notes:  n=286.  Reported betas are standardized 
** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at 
the .10 level 





A similar cross-sectional analysis was conducted on the relationship between competitive 
and cooperative actions and firm performance.  The same tests were run as in previous models; 
however, the measures of competitive and cooperative actions were drawn from the same year as 
the firm’s performance.  This analysis was conducted to examine the extent to which actions in 
the present have an immediate influence on firm performance.  As indicated in Table 5.9, the 
relationship between competitive and cooperative actions and ROA are similar to the results 
found in the lagged models.  The results indicate similar findings with cooperative action having 
a significant linear relationship with ROA (β=.02, p<.05), but the curvilinear effect is not found 
to be significant.  These relationships, however, are significant in the final full model.  Similar to 
the earlier results, the relationship between competitive action and ROA was found to be 
insignificant.  Consistent with the earlier analysis of both measures of performance, the tests 
were regressed on ROS, as well.  The direct effects remain insignificant; however, the indirect 
effects present in model 5 represent significant differences at high and low levels of competitive 
diversity.  These results are presented in Table 5.10.  While these effects are significant, the 
model does not significantly improve the fit of the estimated model.  As such, the differences are 
only reported for descriptive purposes.  The moderation can be seen in Figure 5.4. 
While measures such as ROA and ROS are holistic measures of firm performance 
(Richard et al., 2009), some scholars in related research streams focus attention on a more 
market-based approach to assess measures such as sales or market growth (Ferrier et al., 1999).  
As such post hoc analyses assessed the same relationships as hypothesized in the model, but 







The first alternative measure of firm performance that was examined was the relationship 
between firm actions and sales growth.  Measuring sales growth assesses performance from a 
market-based approach, rather than a returns-based approach when measured as ROA or ROS.  
The measure of sales growth controls for size by calculating percentage growth as opposed to 
simply measuring aggregate growth.  Considering the inherent lag in calculating sales growth as 
a difference score, the independent variables in the models are not lagged.  When examining the 
same relationships as analyzed before, none of the relationships indicate a significant 






























Figure 5.4:  Competitive Diversity Moderating 




Table 5.9:  Non-Lagged Competitive and Cooperative Action to Performance (ROA) 
 Model 1 (Controls) 
Model 2 (Direct Linear 
Effects) 
Model 3 (Direct Linear 
and Curvilinear) 
Model 4 (Linear, 
Curvilinear, 
Moderators) 
Model 5 (Linear 
Curvilinear, Moderators, 
Interactions) 
Independent Variables:      
Competitive Action  .00 -.02 -.02 -.01 
Competitive Action Squared   .01 .01 .00 
Cooperative Action  .02* .05* .06* .07* 
Cooperative Action Squared   -.02 -.03† -.04* 
      
Moderators:      
Competitive Diversity    -.01 -.01 
Cooperative Diversity    -.01 .00 
      
Interactions:      
Competitive Action x 
Competitive Diversity 
    -.01 
Competitive Action Squared 
x Competitive Diversity 
    .02 
Cooperative Action x 
Cooperative Diversity 
    -.03 
Cooperative Action Squared 
x Cooperative Diversity 
    .03 
      
Controls:      
Size .00 .02 .02 .02 .02 
Slack .00 .00 .00 .01 .01 
Performance Variation -.01 -.01 .00 .00 -.01 
TMT Function .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
TMT Age .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
TMT Tenure -.02* -.02** -.02** -.02** -.02** 
TMT Size .00 .01 .01 .01 .00 
      
R2 .60** .61** .61** .62** .62** 
F-Test  F=3.39* F=1.48 F=1.47 F=1.50 
Notes: n=276.  Reported betas are standardized.  ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level.  




Table 5.10:  Non-Lagged Competitive and Cooperative Action to Performance (ROS) 
 Model 1 (Controls) 
Model 2 (Direct Linear 
Effects) 
Model 3 (Direct Linear 
and Curvilinear) 
Model 4 (Linear, 
Curvilinear, 
Moderators) 
Model 5 (Linear 
Curvilinear, Moderators, 
Interactions) 
Independent Variables:      
Competitive Action  .00 -.01 -.02 .01 
Competitive Action Squared   .01 .03 -.04 
Cooperative Action  .00 .02 .03 .04 
Cooperative Action Squared   -.02 -.02 -.04 
      
Moderators:      
Competitive Diversity    -.03** -.05** 
Cooperative Diversity    -.01 .00 
      
Interactions:      
Competitive Action x 
Competitive Diversity 
    -.09* 
Competitive Action Squared 
x Competitive Diversity 
    .14* 
Cooperative Action x 
Cooperative Diversity 
    -.02 
Cooperative Action Squared 
x Cooperative Diversity 
    .03 
      
Controls:      
Size -.09† -.09† -.09 -.08 -.07 
Slack .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 
Performance Variation -.07** -.07** -.07** -.07** -.07** 
TMT Function -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01 
TMT Age .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
TMT Tenure -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 
TMT Size .01 .01 .01 .00 .00 
      
R2 .76** .76** .76** .77** .77** 
F-Test  F=.01 F=.18 F=3.53* F=2.07 
Notes: n=276.  Reported betas are standardized.  ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level.  Firm, Year, and 
Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length. 
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 Another performance measure that was examined is market share growth.  Considering 
the focus of the present study directs attention at the competitive actions of the organization, it is 
important to determine if the enactment of these competitive and cooperative actions influences 
an organization’s performance relative to competitors.  As such, market share growth provides a 
test of how competitive and cooperative actions alter the competitive landscape of a specific 
industry based on firm behaviors.  The models again do not lag the independent variables due to 
the inherent effects of time in the calculation of the dependent variable as a measure of growth 
year over year.  In the analysis of these relationships, none of the relationships between the 
independent actions of the organization and firm performance were found to be significant.  The 
results associated with market share growth are to be interpreted with caution, however.  Due to 
the diversified nature of organizations in both of the industries within the sample, some 
organizations engage in competitive and cooperative actions focused on growing markets beyond 
the scope of the sample industry.  For example, an organization that manufactures medical 
devices may direct competitive and cooperative actions at increasing market share in a secondary 
market like the medical services industry.  In other words, the actions that organizations enact 
may not be directly linked to the growth within the specific market that is calculated within the 
sample. 
 To further examine the results in the proposed research model, I conducted an 
independent analysis of each industry.  As such, I tested the hypothesized lagged models that 
assess the relationships proposed in the research model.  The analyses were conducted on the 




 In terms of the medical devices industry, the results are largely consistent with the overall 
results presented in the combined sample.  These relationships are reported in Tables 5.11 and 
5.12.  The curvilinear relationships between cooperative action and firm performance is again 
found to be significantly related to ROA (linear β=.10, p<.01, quadratic β=-.06, p<.01).  While 
the curvilinear relationship in the overall model was not significant in relation to ROS, the 
medical devices subsample has a significant curvilinear relationship with ROS (linear β=.12, 
p<.01, quadratic β=-.08, p<.05).  The moderating effect of competitive action diversity was again 
found to be nonsignificant.  In the cooperative diversity moderation, however, the significant 
moderating effects are consistent across both ROA and ROS.  These results are consistent with 































Figure 5.5:  Cooperative Diversity Moderating 
Cooperative Action to ROA, Medical Devices 
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Table 5.11:  Lagged Competitive and Cooperative Action to Performance (ROA), Medical Devices 
 Model 1 (Controls) 
Model 2 (Direct Linear 
Effects) 
Model 3 (Direct Linear 
and Curvilinear) 
Model 4 (Linear, 
Curvilinear, 
Moderators) 
Model 5 (Linear 
Curvilinear, Moderators, 
Interactions) 
Independent Variables:      
Competitive Action  -.01 -.02 -.03 -.05† 
Competitive Action Squared   .01 .01 .03 
Cooperative Action  .02† .10** .11** .12** 
Cooperative Action Squared   -.06** -.07** -.08** 
      
Moderators:      
Competitive Diversity    .01 .01 
Cooperative Diversity    -.01 .01 
      
Interactions:      
Competitive Action x 
Competitive Diversity 
    .02 
Competitive Action Squared x 
Competitive Diversity 
    -.02 
Cooperative Action x 
Cooperative Diversity 
    -.09** 
Cooperative Action Squared x 
Cooperative Diversity 
    .06** 
      
Controls:      
Size -.02 -.01 .00 .01 .01 
Slack -.01 .00 -.01 -.01 .02 
Performance Variation -.03* -.03† -.03* -.03* -.02† 
TMT Function .02 .01 .01 .00 .00 
TMT Age .02 .02† .02 .02 .02 
TMT Tenure -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.01 
TMT Size .00 -.01 .00 .00 .00 
      
R2 .66** .68** .71** .72** .76** 
F-Test  F=2.4† F=6.88** F=.75 F=5.14** 
Notes: n=137.  Reported betas are standardized.  ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level.  Firm, Year, and Industry 





Table 5.12:  Lagged Competitive and Cooperative Action to Performance (ROS), Medical Devices 
 Model 1 (Controls) 
Model 2 (Direct Linear 
Effects) 
Model 3 (Direct Linear 
and Curvilinear) 
Model 4 (Linear, 
Curvilinear, 
Moderators) 
Model 5 (Linear 
Curvilinear, Moderators, 
Interactions) 
Independent Variables:      
Competitive Action  -.01 -.09 -.09 -.07 
Competitive Action Squared   .10 .10 .04 
Cooperative Action  .03 .12** .16** .20** 
Cooperative Action Squared   -.08* -.10** -.12** 
      
Moderators:      
Competitive Diversity    .01 .02 
Cooperative Diversity    -.02 .01 
      
Interactions:      
Competitive Action x 
Competitive Diversity 
    -.09 
Competitive Action Squared x 
Competitive Diversity 
    .14 
Cooperative Action x 
Cooperative Diversity 
    -.16** 
Cooperative Action Squared x 
Cooperative Diversity 
    .11** 
      
Controls:      
Size -.11† -.09 -.07 -.06 -.04 
Slack -.01 .00 -.01 -.01 -.01 
Performance Variation -.03 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.02 
TMT Function .01 .01 -.01 -.01 -.01 
TMT Age .02 .02 .01 .00 .01 
TMT Tenure -.03 -.03 -.04 -.04 -.03 
TMT Size -.01 .00 .00 .00 .00 
      
R2 .65** .66** .69** .69** .74** 
F-Test  F=1.24 F=4.87** F=.66 F=5.32** 
Notes: n=132.  Reported betas are standardized.  ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level.  Firm, Year, and Industry 







There are a few differences in the results when the analysis is run independently on the 
oil and gas field services subsample.  First, when the model is analyzed with ROA as the firm 
performance measure, none of the relationships are significant.  While the relationships are not 
significant, the directionality of the relationships between competition and cooperation and firm 
performance are largely consistent with the results found in the full sample.  The previously 
significant relationships in the full model for cooperative action is not found to be supported in 
this model.  The oil and gas field services results are reported in Tables 5.13 and 5.14. 
The most notable difference in the oil and gas field services subsample is the presence of 
interactions in the ROS model.  Model 5, which includes all of the direct and indirect effects, 
provides a significantly better fit when compared to the previous model with only the direct 
effects (F=4.83, p<.01).  In both competitive and cooperative diversity, the results suggest 
Figure 5.6:  Cooperative Diversity Moderating 






























significant moderation of the curvilinear direct effects.  First, the curvilinear relationship 
between competition and performance is found to be moderated by competitive action diversity 
(β=-1.78, p<.01).  This relationship is graphically depicted in Figure 5.7.  Likewise, the 
curvilinear relationship between cooperation and performance is also found to be moderated by 
cooperative diversity (β=1.06, p<.01).  This relationship is graphically depicted in Figure 5.8.  
Lastly, the relationship between cooperation and firm performance is negative when firm 
performance is measured as ROS (linear β=-.21, p<.10; quadratic β=.21, p<.05), whereas in the 
overall sample and the medical devices subsample, the results suggest a positive curvilinear 
effect.  The fit of the direct curvilinear model, however, is only marginally better than the 
previous linear model.  As such, these effects should be interpreted with caution. 
Finally, additional analyses were conducted to examine the balance associated with 
competition and cooperation and how this balance influences firm performance.  While the 
interaction between moderate levels of competition and cooperation was not significant, this 
relationship was further explored by creating ordinal values associated with high, medium, and 
low levels of competition and cooperation.  The sample was split into three levels of competition 
and cooperation based on an assessment of the distribution across the sample (Ketchen & Shook, 
1996).  This categorization of the data generated a 3x3 matrix with observations in each cell 
determined by the level of competition and cooperation.  Calculating and testing the significance 
of differences based on levels of competition and cooperation allows for a more nuanced analysis 































































Figure 5.7:  Competitive Diversity Moderating 
Competitive Action to ROS, Oil and Gas 
Figure 5.8:  Cooperative Diversity Moderating 
Cooperative Action to ROS, Oil and Gas 
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Table 5.13:  Lagged Competitive and Cooperative Action to Performance (ROA), Oil and Gas Field Services 
 Model 1 (Controls) 
Model 2 (Direct Linear 
Effects) 
Model 3 (Direct Linear 
and Curvilinear) 
Model 4 (Linear, 
Curvilinear, 
Moderators) 
Model 5 (Linear 
Curvilinear, Moderators, 
Interactions) 
Independent Variables:      
Competitive Action  .00 -.05 -.05 -.07 
Competitive Action Squared   .11 .13 .18 
Cooperative Action  .03 -.02 .01 .07 
Cooperative Action Squared   .05 .03 -.23 
      
Moderators:      
Competitive Diversity    -.01† -.03 
Cooperative Diversity    -.02 .02 
      
Interactions:      
Competitive Action x 
Competitive Diversity 
    -.07 
Competitive Action Squared 
x Competitive Diversity 
    .12 
Cooperative Action x 
Cooperative Diversity 
    .01 
Cooperative Action Squared 
x Cooperative Diversity 
    .11 
      
Controls:      
Size -.05* -.05† -.04† -.04† -.03 
Slack .02* .02† .02 .02 .01 
Performance Variation .00 .00 -.01 -.01 -.01 
TMT Function .00 .01 -.02† -.02* -.02* 
TMT Age .01† .01* .01* .01* .02* 
TMT Tenure .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
TMT Size .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 
      
R2 .67** .68** .69** .71** .73** 
F-Test  F=1.27 F=1.75 F=2.85† F=1.2 
Notes: n=141.  Reported betas are standardized.  ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level.  Firm, Year, and 
Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length. 
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Table 5.14:  Lagged Competitive and Cooperative Action to Performance (ROS), Oil and Gas Field Services 
 Model 1 (Controls) 
Model 2 (Direct Linear 
Effects) 
Model 3 (Direct Linear 
and Curvilinear) 
Model 4 (Linear, 
Curvilinear, 
Moderators) 
Model 5 (Linear 
Curvilinear, Moderators, 
Interactions) 
Independent Variables:      
Competitive Action  -.18** -.34* -.34* -.10 
Competitive Action 
Squared 
  .37 .32 -.48 
Cooperative Action  -.01 -.21† -.35* -.36* 
Cooperative Action 
Squared 
  .21* .28* -.94 
      
Moderators:      
Competitive Diversity    -.01 -.49** 
Cooperative Diversity    .12† .63** 
      
Interactions:      
Competitive Action x 
Competitive Diversity 
    .13 
Competitive Action 
Squared x Competitive 
Diversity 
    -1.78** 
Cooperative Action x 
Cooperative Diversity 
    -.54** 
Cooperative Action 
Squared x Cooperative 
Diversity 
    1.06** 
      
Controls:      
Size -.29* -.23† -.21 -.17 -.10 
Slack .01 .03 .01 .02 .01 
Performance Variation -.04 -.04 -.05 -.04 -.02 
TMT Function -.02 -.02 -.04 -.04 -.03 
TMT Age .01 .01 .01 .02 .03 
TMT Tenure .04 .03 .04 .03 .01 
TMT Size .00 .00 .01 .01 .00 
      
R2 .76** .78** .80** .80** .83** 
F-Test  F=4.01* F=2.78† F=1.82 F=4.83** 
Notes: n=135.  Reported betas are standardized.  ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level.  Firm, Year, and 
Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length. 
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 To test for significant differences among the groups, a 3x3 ANOVA test was conducted.  
The results provided a comparison and statistical test for significant differences in performance 
based on the level of both competition and cooperation of a firm.  For example, it allows for an 
analysis of how an organization with high competition and moderate cooperation relates to an 
organization with moderate competition and low cooperation.  This analysis was conducted on 
both of the original measures of performance in the previous analysis, ROA and ROS.  The 
results are similar across measures.  Interestingly, neither sample has organizations with low 
competition and high cooperation.  This may be indicative of organizational behavior regarding 
how cooperative behaviors are leveraged for competitive actions.  In essence, organizations that 
are highly engaged in cooperative relationships might use these cooperative engagements to 
initiate competitive actions.  As such, there are no organizations that are highly cooperative with 
low levels of competition.  The specific analyses and results are summarized below. 
 
Table 5.15:  3x3 ANOVA Sample, with ROA 
 Low Coop Medium Coop High Coop 
Low Comp Mean=.06, n=49 Mean=-.06, n=9  
Medium Comp Mean=.05, n=82 Mean=.03, n=71 Mean=.09, n=31 
High Comp Mean=.05, n=2 Mean=.06, n=16 Mean=.09, n=37 
Reported means are measured as ROA 
 
 In the ROA sample, the relationships are largely consistent across groups within the 
ANOVA.  The means are generally consistent across levels of competition and cooperation; 
however, contrary to hypotheses, the middle cell indicating balance of competition and 
cooperation has the lowest level of performance.  While these relationships show some 
differentiation among levels, the only statistically significant group difference is found between 
the high competition, medium cooperation group and the medium competition, medium 
cooperation group.  As shown in the square line in the plot below, the results suggest that 
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organizations with high levels of competition and medium cooperation outperform organizations 
with medium levels of both competition and cooperation.  This relationship may be indicative of 
higher performance of organizations that maximize the resources and synergies from cooperative 
engagements by simultaneously engaging in higher levels of competition as a result of the value 
derived from cooperation.  In essence, firms that leverage the cooperative engagements through 
competitive actions yield higher levels of performance as a result.  Finally, the group of 
organizations with high levels of competition and cooperation also have higher levels of 
performance; however, the difference between groups is nonsignificant.  Below is the interaction 




When the data are run with ROS as the measure of performance, the results are similar 
with one unique difference.  While there was one group with significant differences in the ROA 
Cooperative Action 
Competitive Action 
Figure 5.9: 3x3 ANOVA of Competition 
and Cooperation to ROA 
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analyses, none of the groups are significantly different in the ROS sample; however, the results 
are still shown to identify the similarity and differences between the ROS and ROA samples. 
 
Table 5.16:  3x3 ANOVA Sample, with ROS 
 Low Coop Medium Coop High Coop 
Low Comp Mean=.11, n=50 Mean=-.02, n=11  
Medium Comp Mean=.06, n=86 Mean=.05, n=68 Mean=.09, n=33 
High Comp Mean=.05, n=2 Mean=-.01, n=17 Mean=.11, n=37 
Reported means are measured as ROS 
 
 While the means across the ROA sample were largely similar, there is a broader variation 
of means when the firm’s performance is measured with ROS.  None of the group differences 
were found to be significant, but the plot below shows interesting differences among the groups.  
Most distinctly, the highest group mean for performance as found at low levels of competition 
and cooperation.  This result may be influenced by the high number of organizations with a lack 
of substantial cooperative action reported.  At medium levels of cooperation, there is a distinctly 
higher level of performance when competitive action is also medium within the medium 
cooperation groups.  While this difference is not statistically significant, it still suggests that the 
relationship may be curvilinear in regards to balance leading to optimal levels of performance in 
medium cooperation contexts.  In general, however, the highest level of performance in this 
sample was again found when organizations had higher levels of cooperative activity.  Finally, 
the performance at moderate levels of competition tends to be more consistent, whereas the 
performance of low and high competition groups has a wider spread of means.  While none of 








 While this research model provides a unique perspective of integrating micro and macro 
factors in the context of competition and cooperation, it is not without its limitations.  The first 
limitation is the small sample size of the current study.  From a pragmatic perspective, the labor-
intensive nature of developing dictionaries, independently coding and analyzing thousands of 
headlines, and developing new measurement tools for competition and cooperation limited the 
size and scope of the sample that could be tested in the present study.  While a sample size of 
300 firm-year observations may be considered small compared to the strategic management 
literature at large, it is consistent with the norms and samples of similar research integrating 
competition and cooperation and applying a content analysis framework of data collection and 
coding(Marcel et al., 2011). 
Cooperative Action 
Competitive Action 
Figure 5.10: 3x3 ANOVA of 
Competition and Cooperation to ROS 
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 Second, the dual industry sample may limit the generalizability of the results found in the 
present study.  The sample was limited to two industries for a variety of reasons.  First, to truly 
assess the nature of competition and cooperation within industries, the best way of analyzing the 
phenomena of interest was to capture data that analyzes and assesses a holistic picture of the 
industry.  The stratified industry sample contains firms of all sizes within specific competitive 
domains.  Second, by limiting the sample to two industries, it allowed for controlling broader 
macro factors that may influence the nature of competition and cooperation within the industries.  
Although firm and year specific events were controlled for independently of industry, the dual 
industry sample implicitly controls for other external environmental factors that may confound 
the research model. 
 A third limitation associated with the present study is the nature of the measures and 
content analysis, at large.  The definition of content analysis, and the methodology itself, is 
limited to the extent that content is reported and available to be analyzed (Duriau et al., 2007).  
As such, content analysis is limited by the data available in the form of public reports, news 
reports, press releases, and other mediums of communication.  This research study followed the 
existing norms associated with identifying news sources, collecting news reports, and coding the 
content of these reports to ensure that the results and inferences made are valid and consistent 
with the expectations of rigor in the existing content analysis literature (Neuendorf, 2002). 
Beyond the empirical limitations, there are also inherent theoretical and conceptual 
limitations associated with the present study.  First, the predictive assumptions and relationships 
tested are limited to the scope of the theoretical frameworks applied.  In other words, the 
relationships were defined and limited by the extent to which ABV and the ambidexterity shed 
light on the influence of attention on firm actions and the subsequent performance implications 
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associated with these actions.  While other theories such as signaling theory may lend insight 
into how organizations engage in actions to develop a position and identity within an industry 
(Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011), the focus of the present study is to understand the 
nature and management of attention in relation to firm actions (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005).  Further, 
signaling theory focuses more on the external motivations for competitive and cooperative action 
(Connelly et al., 2010), whereas ABV lends itself to a deeper understanding of the internal 
conflict associated with competition and cooperation (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). 
 Finally, there are also conceptual or structural limitations associated with the present 
study.  While the present study operationalizes firm performance based on existing research 
practices in both competitive dynamics and the broader strategic management literature, other 
research suggests a need for focusing on more direct and related measures rather than using 
global measures of firm performance (Ray, Barney, & Muhanna, 2004).  The lack of findings in 
some of the relationships may be a result of firm performance being too far removed from the 
actions of the organization.  By assessing performance using returns based metrics which are 
inherently internally derived, the model may fail to fully capture the market dynamics that 
influence the relationships between market actions and firm performance (Richard et al., 2009).  
Considering the multidimensional nature of firm performance (Combs et al., 2005), future 
conceptualizations of the relationship between actions and firm performance should leverage 
more nuanced and focused measures of firm performance that align with the predictions and 




CHAPTER 6:  DISCUSSION 
 
 Results of a research project in isolation provide little value or contribution to the field of 
strategic management without being tied to and integrated with the extant research.  The purpose 
of this discussion chapter is to identify how the results of the present research project relate to 
the theory and findings of related research in strategic management.  To recall, the research 
questions of this research can be summarized as: 
(1)  Does the attention-based view of the firm predict competitive and cooperative 
actions? 
 
(2)  Does the independent level of competition and cooperation influence firm 
performance? 
 
(3)  Does type of competitive or cooperative action influence the relationship between 
competition/cooperation and performance? 
 
(4)  Does the integrative balance of competitive and cooperative actions influence a 
firm’s performance? 
 
This chapter provides a discussion of my research findings, with a specific focus on 
understanding how these results are consistent with and distinct from extant research.  
Specifically, the chapter starts with an overview of the theories that are the focus of the research.  
I then discuss the findings from the current research project in reference to the theoretical and 
conceptual domains.  Third, I review the contributions of the research project, along with 
opportunities for future research.  Fourth, I discuss the managerial implications of the results.  
Finally, I conclude with a summary of the results and outcomes associated with the research 
study. 
Overview 
 The study draws on theoretical insights from the attention-based view of the firm (ABV) 
and from research on organizational ambidexterity.  Critical to the understanding of the research 
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model, organizational attention is an important, but limited, resource (Simon, 1947).  Thus, 
organizational action is engaged as members of an organization direct their limited individual 
and collective attention (Ocasio, 1997).  From the ambidexterity perspective, it is suggested that 
organizations must simultaneously engage in sometimes conflicting arenas of action.  In the 
traditional definition of ambidexterity, this balance is considered in the context of exploration 
and exploitation (Gupta et al., 2006; Raisch et al., 2009).  I extend this conceptualization of 
balance and the ambidexterity logic to how organizations collectively address and manage the 
seemingly conflicting demands associated with competition and cooperation. 
The phenomena of competition and cooperation also represent research domains with 
strong conceptual underpinnings in the competitive dynamics and alliance portfolio research 
streams.  Competitive dynamics research has shed light on how competitive action influences 
firm performance, and has tested a variety of direct and indirect effects to generate a large body 
of literature to support the importance of competitive action to firm performance (Chen & Miller, 
2012).  Similarly, cooperation research has contributed to the strategic management literature by 
identifying and analyzing characteristics of cooperation primarily within dyads that contribute to 
higher levels of individual and collaborative performance (Das & Teng, 1998).  While 
competition and cooperation researchers have independently contributed to the strategic 
management literature, research integrating these two phenomena simultaneously is still a 
relatively nascent stream of inquiry. 
Having provided a brief overview of the relevant research streams, the following section 
focuses on identifying the similarities and differences between the dissertation and existing 
research.  Structurally, the sections are discussed based on their theoretical and contextual 
domain—ABV and ambidexterity are discussed as the theoretical foundations, and competitive 
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dynamics and cooperation research are discussed in reference to their contextual foundations.  
The results of the hypothesis testing and post hoc analyses are discussed in reference to the direct 
and indirect effects hypothesized in the model, as well a discussion of how the control 
relationships compare and contrast with the existing literature. 
Attention Based View of the Firm 
 At the core of ABV are three concepts: (1)  the focus of attention within organizations, 
(2) the situated nature of attention, and (3) the structural distribution of attention (Ocasio, 1997).  
The directed nature of attention implies that actions will likely be engaged where an individual 
or organization devotes attention (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009).  The situated nature of attention 
implies that attention is relative (Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill, & Lawrence, 2001).  Bounded 
rationality suggests that attention is a finite resource, and as such, limits and determines how 
attention is directed and applied to multiple stimuli (Simon, 1947).  The structural distribution of 
attention addresses the structural attributes of attention.  Managers within the firm develop and 
structure organizations based on the existing strategies and objectives of the organization, and 
provide insight into the structural distribution of organizational attention (Kabanoff & Brown, 
2008).  While most research has focused on individual pillars of ABV independently of one 
another, this research addresses two of the pillars simultaneously (Ocasio & Joseph, 2008). 
 Organizational attention, or the aggregation and application of attention of organizational 
members, has yet to be fully conceptualized or empirically explored in the existing ABV 
literature (Ocasio, 2011).  This research focuses on understanding how an organization positions 
and self-identifies phenomena and issues that are important for the organization to address at the 
organization level.  By linking the firm-reported attention to competition and cooperation at the 
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organizational level in annual reports to the enactment of competitive and cooperative action, 
this research takes a step toward extending ABV to a new level of analysis. 
 The findings of the attention-based relationships in the research model align well with the 
existing research while also adding to the field with new constructs and measures.  Prior research 
has analyzed the effects of executive attention on the enactment of specific actions of the 
organization (Kaplan, 2008; Marcel et al., 2011); however, the present model assesses the 
relationships between attention to competition and cooperation and subsequent competitive and 
cooperative action at the firm level.  Testing the direct relationships between competitive and 
cooperative actions provides an empirical analysis of the focus of attention and also the situated 
nature of attention proposed by ABV. 
First, ABV was leveraged to theorize that competitive actions are positively influenced 
by competitive attention (H1a), and negatively influenced by cooperative attention (H2b).  While 
these results were not found to be significant, the relationships were both in the direction 
suggested by the theory and the hypotheses.  These results may have been found for a few 
reasons. First, competitive actions are not likely to be explicated ex ante due to the nature of the 
information being shared.  Organizations may not choose to willingly identify and disclose the 
competitive factors deemed most important to the organization for fear of giving away valuable 
information that can be readily accessed by competitors in publicly available documents 
(Midgley, Marks, & Cooper, 1997).  In other words, organizations may not address competitive 
factors in annual reports to avoid the potential dangers associated with “showing their next 
move” to competitors (Chen, 1996). Second, competitive actions are not all equal in magnitude.  
An organization’s decision to invest heavily in research in development and an organization’s 
small donation to a non-profit are weighted equally in the present study.  This measurement of 
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competitive action is consistent with the extant competitive dynamics research, and suggests a 
need for a deeper analysis in regards to competitive action weighting (Chen & Miller, 2012).  
Annual reports are likely to predict the larger types of competitive actions due to their scope, but 
some of the smaller competitive actions may not be referenced or addressed in the organization’s 
report. 
In the control relationships, slack was found to be strongly and significantly related to the 
enactment of competitive activity (β=15.6, p<.01).  This is consistent with the research that 
suggests liquid assets offer organizations opportunities to leverage these resources with relatively 
short lead times for competitive actions (George, 2005).  In other words, organizations with 
available liquid assets are more readily able to leverage these resources to enact competitive 
actions.  A second significant finding in the controls relationships is the negative effect of TMT 
functional diversity and the enactment of competitive actions (β=-5.60, p<.01).  This negative 
relationships suggests that organizations with more diverse top management teams enact fewer 
competitive actions.  This finding supports the notion that too much diversity on a top 
management team may lead to organizational rigidity and an inability to develop consensus and 
enact competitive actions in the market (Smith et al., 1994). 
Second, the relationships were tested in relation to the enactment of cooperative actions.  
The positive relationship between cooperative attention and cooperative action (H1b) was found 
to be significant (β=.63, p<.01); however, the negative relationship between competitive 
attention and cooperative action was not found to be significant (H2a).  The nonfindings for the 
negative relationship may again be attributed to the nature of competitive attention.  
Organizations may choose to speak vaguely in terms of competitive attention in order to avoid 
showing competitors their future actions and strategies.  As such, a strong direct correlation may 
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not be found due to the broad scope of the annual report (Huselid, 1995).  The positive 
relationship partially supports the ABV notion of focused attention, in that organizational 
attention as measured by annual reports is positively associated with the subsequent enactment of 
cooperative activity.  This finding extends the existing research leveraging letters to shareholders 
by testing this relationship at the organizational level (Marcel et al., 2011). 
Size was also found to be negatively and significantly related to the enactment of 
cooperative actions (β=-2.24, p<.01).  This negative relationship suggests that larger firms have 
fewer cooperative engagements relative to their smaller counterparts.  This finding suggests that 
larger organizations are not as dependent on other organizations, and as such require fewer 
relationships to be competitive (Gomes-Casseres, 1997).  This supports recent research 
suggesting that smaller, more entrepreneurial firms are more reliant on cooperative relationships 
(Kellermanns, Walter, Crook, Kemmerer, & Narayanan, 2014). 
TMT characteristics were also found to be significant in relation to competitive and 
cooperative action, and these results largely support the extant research on upper echelons 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  First, TMT functional diversity is found to be positively related to 
cooperative action (β=.57, p<.01).  This finding suggests that more diverse top management 
teams identify cooperative engagements as a unique way to integrate knowledge and other 
resources into the organization through cooperative engagements.  The findings in regards to size 
and TMT functional diversity aligns well with research examining the relationship between TMT 
characteristics, the interdependence of organizations, and the performance implications of 
functional diversity within firms. with varying degrees of interdependence with other 
organizations (Michel & Hambrick, 1992).  While existing research has addressed TMT 
characteristics as an indirect determinant of competitive actions (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004; Miller & 
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Chen, 1996), the present findings suggest further exploration of attention as a direct effect may 
provide valuable insights into the antecedents of competitive and cooperative actions.  Finally, 
TMT size was negatively related to cooperative engagements (β=-.41, p<.05).  This finding may 
be indicative of smaller top management teams reaching consensus about cooperative activities 
than larger top management teams, possibly as a result of lower conflict within the TMT 
(Amason & Sapienza, 1997). 
The relationships tested in the attention side of the model provide an intriguing starting 
point for future research leveraging ABV.  While only one of the hypothesis was statistically 
significant (H1b), the relationships in the model suggest a need for further exploration into the 
situated nature of attention in regards to potentially conflicting phenomena within the 
organizational context.  Competitive attention may require a deeper analysis leveraging 
qualitative methodology to further explore if and how organizations address competitive factors 
at the organizational level.  This type of analysis would align well with existing studies assessing 
attention (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Marcel et al., 2011), but would also extend this research by 
analyzing attention as an organizational phenomenon.  Considering these intriguing findings, 
future research addressing organizational level manifestations of attention are likely to contribute 
and extend both the ABV literature and the strategic management literature. 
The implied paradox associated with the attention to competition and cooperation as a 
result of bounded rationality and the finite nature of attention within the organization was not 
supported by the findings.  While only one of the four hypotheses is supported in the analysis, 
the directionality of the results generally support the implicit paradox of competition and 
cooperation within the firm.  This interdependence of attention to competition and cooperation 
suggests further exploration into how organizations and top management teams enact optimal 
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levels of competitive and cooperative activity.  Considering the finite nature of attention within 
the firm and the implicit paradox associated with competition and cooperation, I also hope to 
contribute to the domain of ambidexterity. 
Ambidexterity 
 The second theoretical framework for the research is found in the conceptual foundations 
in the ambidexterity literature.  At the core of ambidexterity is the concept of paradox and the 
necessary balance and potential complementarity associated with paradoxical actions (March, 
1991; Raisch et al., 2009).  While this framework has largely been limited to the discussion of 
exploration and exploitation (He & Wong, 2004), the logical tenets are not conceptualized such 
that they are contextually bounded.  As such, this research takes an early step towards leveraging 
the ambidexterity logic in a paradoxical context outside of the exploration and exploitation 
domain. 
 The conflicting interests between competition and cooperation are largely implicit, and 
the true nature of these two behaviors has yet to be fully explored at the organization level.  
Research integrating these two paradoxical behaviors has largely been assessed at the dyad level, 
specifically assessing the pure coopetition between two organizations (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; 
Park et al., 2013).  While this perspective provides unique insight into the relationship between 
competition and cooperation within a dyadic relationship, it ignores an organization’s overall 
competitive and cooperative orientation.  The present research suggests that competition and 
cooperation do not occur in a vacuum, and the actions associated with competition and 
cooperation attention have interdependent characteristics that must be managed appropriately at 
the organizational level. 
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 Integrating ideas from ambidexterity research with the concept of bounded rationality, a 
better understanding of the finite nature of attention emerges.  In particular, the need for 
simultaneous attention toward both competitive and cooperative actions becomes clearer.  As 
discussed above, only a few of these relationships were identified as significant.  However, the 
inherent conflict between the competitive and cooperative attention can be seen in the positive 
effects from attention to competition and cooperation to their respective actions (H1a and H1b), 
and the negative crossover effect of cooperative attention on competitive action (H2b).  While 
the relationships were not found to be significant, the direction of the relationships suggest that 
attention to one action is inherently relative to the attention devoted to another action.  More 
broadly, this suggests an inherent conflict that warrants further empirical exploration. 
While ambidexterity research provides conceptual implications for the balance of 
competitive and cooperative attention, it also applies to identifying optimal levels of competitive 
and cooperative actions (Park et al., 2013).  The preliminary findings from the post hoc analyses 
suggest that higher levels of both competition and cooperation yield higher levels of firm 
performance.  The initial operationalization of balance by generating an industry adjusted level 
of competition and cooperation yielded nonsignificant findings (H5).  However, when taking a 
more granular look using the 3x3 ANOVA analysis of the multiple groups at low, medium, and 
high levels of competition and cooperation, it suggests that the highest performing firms, when 
assessed in relation to both competition and cooperation, were the firms with high levels of 
cooperation and high levels of competition.  These results are consistent with the results found in 
the independent competition and cooperation literature (Das & Teng, 1998; Ferrier et al., 1999); 
however, by assessing these relationships simultaneously, it suggests that competition and 
cooperation integratively yield higher levels of firm performance.  Considering the highest 
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performance was generally found at high levels of competition and cooperation, the findings 
suggest a synergistic relationship between two paradoxical actions as conceptualized in the 
ambidexterity research. 
A key implication and contribution of the study is that balance is not necessarily defined 
as 50/50.  In other words, balance is not assessed based on a 1:1 relationship of competitive and 
cooperative actions.  It is balance relative to the peers within the industry.  Balance is found to be 
positively related to firm performance at high levels of both competition and cooperation, 
partially supported at moderate levels of competition and cooperation, and unassessed at low 
levels of competition and cooperation as a result of a lack of firms with low levels of both 
competition and cooperation.  Again, the strong performance of organizations with high levels of 
competition and cooperation suggest the balance of these actions yields better performance (Park 
et al., 2013).  These preliminary findings suggest a need for further exploration into the 
potentially synergistic relationship between the implicitly interdependent actions of competition 
and cooperation. 
Competitive Dynamics 
 Competitive dynamics research has focused on identifying antecedents and outcomes 
associated with the enactment of competitive actions of organizations (Ketchen et al., 2004).  To 
date, researchers have been able to identify organizational actions that contribute to competitive 
advantages and higher firm performance (Smith et al., 2001), direct and indirect effects of 
competitive activity, types of competitive activity, and firm characteristics to further extend the 
domain of competitive dynamics (Chen & Miller, 2012).  The results from the present study 
align well with this focus on dynamic actions of organizations (Rindova & Kotha, 2001), and 
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extend the empirical frontiers of competitive dynamics by conceptualizing and testing curvilinear 
and indirect effects of competition antecedents and outcomes at the organization level. 
 Often lacking in competitive dynamics research is the simultaneous assessment of 
antecedents and outcomes associated with competitive activity in an integrative model (Smith et 
al., 2001).  Research often examines antecedents of competitive actions and outcomes of 
competitive actions as largely independent of one another (Chen & Miller, 2012).  This research 
focuses on understanding how attention shapes competitive actions, and the subsequent 
performance implications of these actions in an integrative model.  While attention is not found 
to be significantly related to competitive action in the original model, the post hoc analysis of a 
non-lagged relationship suggest marginal support that competitive attention (as shown within the 
annual report) is positively related to the enactment of competitive actions (H1a).  This may 
suggest that the decision making processes associated with competition are more immediate than 
the decision making processes associated with cooperative actions (Georgiou, Becchio, Glover, 
& Castiello, 2007).  Further research exploring an integrative assessment of organizational level 
attention in relation to competitive activity may yield intriguing results regarding how and when 
organizations engage in competitive action.  A potentially important implication is that a closer 
examination of the temporal effects of attention on actions appears needed. 
 In strategic management and competitive dynamics research, the vast majority of the 
studies assume and analyze linear relationships (Chen & Miller, 2012).  This research posits that 
the linear assumptions and predictions are not necessarily always the case.  The relationships in 
the research model proposed a curvilinear effect of competitive action on firm performance, such 
that competitive actions yield diminishing returns at higher levels of activity (H3b).  When 
performance is measured as ROS the results actually suggest a negative relationship with a 
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positive curvilinear effect, resulting in a U-shaped relationship between competitive actions and 
firm performance.  In other words, as organizations increase competitive activity, the returns 
become increasingly larger. 
This finding may suggest that organizations improve in their ability to capitalize on 
competitive actions as they engage in more competitive activity overall (Ingram & Baum, 1997).  
These learning effects might translate into higher levels of performance for the organization 
(Garvin, 2000).  Although this finding does not align with the existing competitive dynamics 
research that suggests a positive linear effect of competitive activity on firm performance, the 
models are analyzed in the presence of cooperative actions.  Previous research that treated and 
analyzed competitive and cooperative actions as independent only provides a partial 
representation of how these actions influence firm performance.  When competitive and 
cooperative action are analyzed simultaneously, the effects associated with competition and 
cooperation become more evident.  These results from the integrative models warrant further 
exploration. 
Third, in the post hoc analysis of the oil and gas field services industry, although the main 
effects of the curvilinear and linear relationships of competitive actions and performance are not 
significant, the significant moderation of these relationships—or the difference between the 
slopes—at low and high levels of diversity of competitive actions suggests interesting results 
(H4b).  When competitive diversity is low, the relationship is convex (U-shape); however, at 
high competitive action diversity the relationship is concave (inverted U-shape).  This 
moderation suggests that when actions are largely similar, organizations are able to increase 
performance through repetition of these behaviors.  This is consistent with the development and 
application of heuristics (Bingham et al., 2007).  On one hand, low levels of diversity allow for 
113 
 
organizational learning to be applied to improve firm performance (Miller, 1993a).  On the other 
hand, the results are also consistent with research on misappropriation of heuristics when 
competitive diversity is high.  The results suggest that at high levels of competitive diversity, 
organizations may be overlooking discrepancies between actions and fail to apply the necessary 
due diligence to ensure the competitive actions are appropriate (Miller & Chen, 1996).  These 
intriguing results in the subsample warrant further exploration of the moderating effects of 
diversity of competitive activity on the relationship between competitive actions and firm 
performance. 
Cooperation 
 Traditionally, cooperation research has leveraged a structural or relational perspective to 
understanding the challenges and benefits of cooperation.  On one hand, network theory has been 
applied to understand how a firm’s relative position within a structural network of peers can lead 
to competitive advantages (Provan et al., 2007).  On the other hand, research on dyadic 
relationships has provided rich insight into the nature of cooperation within specific cooperative 
engagements (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  Research on cooperation at the organization level has been 
limited, although research addressing alliance portfolios has provided an initial conceptualization 
of how organizations manage cooperative engagements holistically (Wassmer, 2010).  The 
research presented here extends the alliance portfolio literature by simultaneously assessing the 
organization level cooperation and competition in the same research model.  
 Alliance portfolio research has largely focused on performance implications of different 
cooperative actions (Jiang et al., 2010; Lavie, 2007).  This research is consistent with the existing 
research by examining outcomes of cooperative action, but it simultaneously analyzes the 
antecedents of cooperative action, as well.  The results suggest that the attention devoted to 
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cooperation at the firm level is associated with of the enactment of subsequent cooperative 
activity (H1b).  This extends the existing literature by examining the presence and effect of a 
theoretically grounded measure of attention as an antecedent of cooperative action of the firm. 
In terms of outcomes associated with cooperative action, the results provide interesting 
contributions to the literature—namely the significance of the curvilinear relationship between 
cooperation and firm performance (H3a).  As hypothesized, the results support the notion of 
diminishing returns as cooperative actions increase.  Challenging the existing linear analyses 
present in extant research, this research suggests that cooperation is beneficial to the 
organization, to a point.  The curvilinear findings are consistent with the misappropriation of 
heuristics, while also supporting the notion of organizational learning at low to moderate levels 
of cooperative action (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Rothaermel, 2001). 
Also of interest to cooperation research are the moderation effects of cooperative action 
diversity in the proposed model and the post hoc robustness tests.  Supporting the hypothesized 
moderating effects, organizations with higher levels of diversity in cooperative engagements 
have lower levels of performance when overall cooperative action is high (H4a).  However, 
higher levels of cooperative diversity are beneficial at low levels of cooperative actions.  This 
may support the notion that organizations seek out and contract companies with unrelated 
expertise to increase firm performance rather than incur the costs associated with conducting 
these unrelated actions within the organization (Jones & Hill, 1988; Williamson, 1981). 
Also, the interaction of volume and diversity of cooperative actions further supports the 
misappropriation of heuristics outlined above.  In other words, the increase in number and type 
of cooperative actions provides more opportunities for managers to not only engage in too many 
cooperative actions but also engaging in the wrong types of cooperative engagements (Gulati et 
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al., 2012).  While these relationships are beneficial at low levels of overall cooperation, the 
danger of misappropriated heuristics appears to become even greater when the cooperative 
actions are highly diverse and unrelated (Jiang et al., 2010).  Considering the presence of the 
moderating effect in the full model and several robustness tests, further research integrating both 
quantity and diversity of cooperative actions is likely to provide valuable contributions to the 
cooperation literature.  In particular, there is still a need to further explore the effects of 
cooperative actions in the presence of competition to fully understand how organizations 
leverage cooperative engagements through competitive actions. 
Summary of Contributions 
 By developing and testing a theoretically grounded research model that addresses both 
antecedents and outcomes of competitive and cooperative actions of organizations, this research 
makes the following contributions.  First, this research represents some of the earliest 
operationalization and empirical analysis of attention at the organizational level.  The assessment 
of attention, action, and performance at the organizational level extends the existing ABV 
literature by developing and applying a dictionary and framework of analysis that can be applied 
in future research.  By developing and validating this dictionary, it offers future researchers the 
opportunity to analyze an organization’s holistic application of attention and how this direction 
of attention is manifested in actions.  In terms of results of the present study, I found significant 
positive effects of attention to cooperation to cooperative actions.  I also found significance in 
non-lagged models of attention to competition in relation to competitive actions.  These results 
suggest the presence of organizational attention and the direct effects of this attention on the 
enactment of competitive and cooperative actions. 
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 Second, the model proposed and tested curvilinear relationships to challenge the existing 
linear assumptions in both competition and cooperation literatures.  The curvilinear effects of 
cooperation on firm performance were largely supported (H3a), however the curvilinear 
relationship between competition and firm performance was found to be nonsignificant (H3b).  
These direct effects suggest that the theories applied and analyses conducted should consider the 
diminishing returns associated with organizations’ actions.  Rather than assuming and analyzing 
relationships as purely linear in nature, future theory development should consider the potentially 
curvilinear effects associated with organizational actions. 
 Third, the model moved beyond studying merely quantity of organizational actions and 
simultaneous assessed the nature of actions, as well.  Rather than simply assessing relationships 
based solely on volume of competitive or cooperative activity, this research tests the moderating 
effects of type or diversity of competitive and cooperative actions on the existing curvilinear 
relationships. These moderating effects were found to be significant in the cooperative action 
relationships (H4a), and also in some of the post hoc analyses on the competition to performance 
relationship (H4b).  This research is an early attempt to test and find significant moderating 
effects of action diversity on the curvilinear relationships between competitive and cooperative 
actions and subsequent firm performance. 
Fourth, the timing of performance outcomes represents an interesting opportunity for 
future research.  The results suggest differential effects on firm performance depending on how 
and when performance is assessed.  For example, cooperative actions’ influence on firm 
performance is largely realized when measured as ROA—suggesting a longer term commitment 
of resources for a more holistic and long term positive effect on firm performance.  When 
measured as ROS, however, the relationship between competition and performance is significant.  
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The window of opportunity, and the time needed to effectively develop competitive and 
cooperative actions, may be different based on the type of action being performed by the 
organization.  Further research exploring the timing and even sequencing of competitive and 
cooperative actions would provide deeper insights into the dynamic nature of competitive and 
cooperative actions. 
 Fifth, this research describes and tests the importance of balanced competition and 
cooperation.  Leveraging conceptual tenets from the ambidexterity logic (March, 1991), the 
model assesses the interdependent relationship between competition and cooperation in both the 
attention and action contexts.  From the attention perspective, the relationship between attention 
to competition and cooperation is implied to be a zero sum relationship such that attention to one 
is at the expense of another.  This is seen in the significant positive linear effects, and implied by 
the negative, though nonsignificant, effects of attention to cooperation on competitive actions 
(H1 and H2). 
In terms of balance of actions, a firm’s ability to effectively leverage competitive and 
cooperative actions are likely limited by the extent to which organizational members are able to 
devote the necessary time and effort to these actions.  While firms can engage in high levels of 
competition or cooperation, ambidexterity posits that an inherent balance of potentially 
synergistic actions like competition and cooperation is necessary (Park et al., 2013).  While I 
hypothesized balance based on moderate levels of both competition and cooperation (H5), the 
results generally support the positive effects of high levels of competition and cooperation rather 
than moderate levels of both.  This does not rule out the synergistic effects, but rather suggests a 
potentially stronger synergistic effect than previously assumed.  This analysis of balance and 
interdependence of competition and cooperation provides a starting point for futures research 
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simultaneously assessing the effects of competition and cooperation on firm performance at the 
organization level. 
 In terms of theoretical contribution, this research further explores the boundary 
conditions associated with ABV.  In the extant research, attention is measured solely at the 
individual level (Kaplan, 2008; Marcel et al., 2011).  This research posits that an organization’s 
attention is a product of the managers’ and members’ attention within the organization and 
examines how this composite attention influences an organization’s actions.  By extending ABV 
to another level, developing and testing a new measure of attention, and assessing the focused 
and situated tenets of attention in congruence with ambidexterity, this research extends ABV 
theory while also providing measurement tools for future research in this domain. 
 While this research does not fit the pure definition of coopetition as indicated by 
simultaneous competition and cooperation within a dyad (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014), it does 
provide results that explore the interdependence of these two actions at the firm level.  Rather 
than focusing on the relationship level of analysis, this research takes an organizational approach 
to understand how firms leverage competitive and cooperative actions simultaneously.  While 
coopetition is defined by the dyad, the present study approaches the integration of competition 
and cooperation as a firm level phenomenon.  In other words, this study suggests that a firm’s 
coopetitive orientation provides an assessment of how firms simultaneous manage and leverage 
the potential synergies associated with competition and cooperation.  By taking an early step 
towards assessing firm level competition and cooperation integratively, this research extends 
coopetition beyond the limited scope of individual relationships and offers a firm level 
operationalization of coopetition.  This approach of assessing firm level actions may yield a 




 For results to be translated and applied to real world contexts, it is important to identify 
the tangible outcomes associated with a given research project.  At the core of the present 
research is the inherent paradox associated with the ever present actions of competition and 
cooperation.  All organizations engage in competitive and cooperative action, and how 
organizations and individuals manage these seemingly contradictory actions have performance 
implications.  The results of the present study can be broken down based on the relationships 
being tested:  (1) the relationships between competitive and cooperative attention to actions and 
(2) the relationships between competitive and cooperative actions and firm performance. 
 In terms of attention leading to action, the results provide evidence that attention of 
individuals and organizations is limited.  The results and relationships suggest that where an 
organization directs the attention of its members is likely to be related to subsequent actions by 
the organization.  Specifically, the results suggest that attention to cooperation is positively 
related to cooperative action.  The results also suggest partial support for attention to competitive 
factors leading to the enactment of competitive actions.  While nonsignificant, the results also 
suggest a relative nature of attention.  In other words, the direction of attention to one factor may 
be at the expense of directing that attention to another.  From a managerial perspective, these 
results suggest a need for direction and management of organizational members’ attention on the 
types of actions an organization hopes to enact.  By explicitly addressing, directing, and 
managing attention within the organization, managers will likely be able to more effectively 
address the important and relevant factors the organization faces. 
 Second, the results provide interesting implications for the relationship between firm 
actions and firm performance.  As a result of the analysis of high, medium, and low levels of 
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competition and cooperation, these results suggest an obvious need for both competitive and 
cooperative actions for higher levels of firm performance.  Considering the strong levels of 
performance when competitive and cooperative action are high, the results suggest that these two 
actions are potentially interdependent and provide synergistic performance implications for a 
firm.  While the results suggest a need for both competitive and cooperative actions, these 
actions must be carefully managed and applied.  When the results are analyzed based on volume 
and type of actions, the implications suggest caution regarding engaging in too many or too 
diverse competitive or cooperative actions.  For instance cooperative actions have diminishing 
returns at high levels, and further these diminishing returns are magnified when the cooperative 
actions are highly diverse. 
In regards to competitive actions, the results suggest that the highest performance occurs 
at low and high levels of competitive activity.  In terms of volume of actions, moderate 
competitive action is found to have the lowest level of performance.  On one hand, low levels of 
competitive activity may indicate a focus on a small but effective repertoire of competitive 
actions.  On the other hand, it might suggest that organizations that engage in higher levels of 
competitive actions become more effective at leveraging these actions due to learning effects and 
repetition.  Considering these findings, organizational managers need to focus on competitive 
actions that the firm leverages effectively and identify opportunities to apply these actions when 
and where appropriate. 
Conclusion 
 The focus of my dissertation is to extend the strategic management literature by 
examining the nature of relationships among competition and cooperation, and how these 
relationships influence firm performance.  By integrating the conceptual implications of the 
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attention based view of the firm with ambidexterity in the context of competitive and cooperative 
actions of organizations, this dissertation provides conceptual and empirical contributions to the 
strategic management literature.  It conceptually defines and empirically tests a sequential model 
that links internal factors of the organization with the subsequent actions of the organizations.  It 
also analyzes how these actions influence subsequent firm performance.  The present research 
suggests that, while existing research largely treats competition and cooperation independently of 
one another, an interdependent conceptualization of these two phenomena may be more 
appropriate.  From an attention perspective, cooperative attention was found to be significantly 
related to the enactment of cooperative action.  Second, the relationship between cooperative 
action and firm performance was found to be significant and with the hypothesized diminishing 
returns.  Finally, the moderating effect of cooperative diversity on the existing curvilinear 
relationship between cooperative action and performance was found to be significant, such that 
higher diversity increased the diminishing returns at lower levels of cooperative activity.  
Broadly speaking, this research will hopefully stimulate and encourage future research to address 
the unique relationships among competition and cooperation, and to further explore how these 
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